Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement: A Policy Option

Counter-Insurgency and Counter-Terrorism

              Due to the current military engagements involving the USG, COIN and CT have become two of the most prevalent American strategies. Both are used to deal with groups that focus on asymmetrical warfare. As those organizations do not have the military capability to fight the US military in open-combat, they are forced to focus their efforts on smaller attacks. That focus has led to a high degree of experience in fighting against s powerful military with surprising efficiency. Despite these similarities COIN and CT are very different approaches to dealing with asymmetrical warfare. The differences are not only present in a practical sense of what to do, but also in a philosophical sense of how to do it.
               COIN is a military strategy that focuses on fighting a better kind of war. Though that statement seems to be contradictory, the strategy has resulted in some limited successes in the past. The goal of the COIN approach is not to outright kill all of the enemy combatants. Rather the focus is placed on winning over the "hearts and minds" of the people in the area of operation. In other words, the goal of COIN is to use a combination of assets to support the local population as well as guide the region in a process of nation-building. In the case of Afghanistan the goal of COIN strategy was to convince those people who had not already sided with the Taliban that the US was fighting as a force for good. By persuading the local people of the US's good intentions, the people would be less inclined to support the Taliban and the groups base of support would fade away. The USG would then help the Afghan people in forming a new, more democratic, government. The logic behind these actions is that by increasing the public order, by befriending the local population, and forming a more stable government will provide conditions inhospitable to an insurgency. As with any military strategy, COIN has a large share of critics. Opponents of COIN have argued that the policy is not aggressive enough against the actual insurgent forces. Other point out that the US has typically had poor result when attempting nation-building operations, with examples of Afghanistan, Vietnam and Somalia. 
               CT is a far more aggressive strategy than COIN. Instead of focusing on a positive image of the US, CT strategy features tactical strikes and raids to eliminate members of terrorist organization. CT argues that to cripple terrorist organizations that leadership members need to be eliminated. In more recent years CT has become the center strategy of the USG when dealing with hostile regions. This can be seen in the operations of Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. Whereas COIN focuses on building up the local region, CT strategy focuses solely on enemy casualties. To accomplish this goal the USG implements several kinds of tactics. The tactic most popularized by the media is drone strikes. In recent years drone strikes have gone from one of the many tactics to the forefront of US strategy. Another type of tactic that is used by the USG is raids, such as the one that was used to eliminate Osama Bin Laden in 2014. As with COIN, CT is not without its own critics. CT has likely caused more public outcry than COIN due to what the public views as indiscriminate killings. The recent bombing of a Doctors Without Borders hospital is one of the many examples that critics point to as the failings of CT strategies. Another criticism of CT is that the focus on killing terrorists lead to the creation of more terrorists. The argument is that the seemingly random strikes by the US military provide terrorist organizations the legitimacy that they need to recruit more members. 
           

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