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Iran’s decreasing religiosity, not everything is as it seems

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In Kazemipur’s 2022 book “Part 3, “Backlash: Streets, Young People, Women, and Demography” in Sacred as Secular : Secularization under Theocracy in Iran” He first argues that religious tendencies have evolved dimorphically in Iran’s youth post-1979 revolution between individual beliefs and communal practices.[1] Therefore secondly, the youth’s and (especially women’s) views on religion have been informed by social and political outcomes as opposed to purely theological rationale despite the Islamization of the state.

It is important to note that the first set of data that Kazemipur provides and analyzes for us from two national surveys shows that dimorphism occurs in specific aspects of religiosity. Some aspects remain the same and some change significantly between 1974-2001. For example, from the data provided the percentage of people practicing daily prayer was 83% in 1974, and was reported to be 82% in 2000 which is incredibly consistent for that period. Now compared to the difference in the percentage of people going to communal prayer in 1974 it was reported as 59% and in 2000 was only 20%. (122) These are just a few examples of the dimorphic change in Iran’s youth. Young people have shown to be consistent with their private beliefs even though the percentage of those who identify with communal religious practices has decreased, thus the appearance of the society at large may appear more secular as the associations of religion in Iran are more closely related to social, political, and economic resources. To summarize this Kazemipur writes: “Young Iranians seem to be withdrawing from those dimensions of religion that have been more directly subjected to policy making, an indication of their dissatisfaction with the newly assigned social roles of religion."[1] In addition to this downward shift of attitude towards religious influence, it is imperative to have narratives and ideas around political access and social resources to highlight the role of women throughout the revolution and its aftermath in their continual efforts for women’s rights.

The role of religious affiliation and access to resources and opportunities is not lost on the youth of Iran, as with the Islamization of the state, other tangential structures like the private sector and other bureaucratic systems carry the same religious influences. Understanding the role of women in the shift of religiosity gives us a deeper insight into the future of Iranian sentiments. Women at the time were willing to accept certain religious requirements because they were going to receive certain freedoms and equalizations in the eyes of the state. In the fight for women's rights for example, Kazemipur describes: “Women’s suffrage was among the first vexing issues, complicated of course by Khomeini's stated opposition to women’s suffrage in 1962. In the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution (…) His response was remarkably similar to what the shah had done, Including rejecting the conservative Muslim clergy’s position.”[1] This points to a fundamental contradiction in the Women’s rights movement and the religious patriarchal sentiment of the state that will continue even into the present day.

Although a large number of Iran’s youth still hold private religious beliefs, the communal practices engaging in public displays of religiosity have plummeted since pre-revolution. The socio-political effects of religion and its structural enmeshment into the establishment have pushed young Iranians to embody a stronger secular identity, and thus perceive their society as less religious in turn.


[1] Kazemipur, Abdolmohammad. Part 3, “Backlash: Streets, Young People, Women, and Demography” in Sacred as Secular : Secularization under Theocracy in Iran. Montreal, Quebec: McGill-Queens University Press, 2022. https://www.mqup.ca/sacred-as-secular-products-9780228008477.php
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