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• 1 2020-11-13T12:34:13-08:00 Consent Underlying Fair Play Theory 6 By Ashley Ka
  
  Fair play theory’s appeal lies in its supposed ability to explain political obligation without the problems that arise when relying on consent to ground that obligation. However, I aim to show that the fair play account does not succeed in providing a distinct basis for political obligation, as it relies upon consent. I examine several illustrative variations of Robert Nozick’s neighborhood example to demonstrate that in each case, the presence or absence of consent aligns with our intuitive conclusions about the respective presence or absence of obligation. I find that fair play fails to provide an account of obligation (including political obligation) that provides a useful alternative to consent. Consent remains the driving force behind “fair play” obligations. plain 2020-11-30T11:27:09-08:00 47.6062095, -122.3320708

  Ashley Ka

  Abstract

  Fair play theory’s appeal lies in its supposed ability to explain political obligation without the problems that arise when relying on consent to ground that obligation. However, I aim to show that the fair play account does not succeed in providing a distinct basis for political obligation, as it relies upon consent. I examine several illustrative variations of Robert Nozick’s neighborhood example to demonstrate that in each case, the presence or absence of consent aligns with our intuitive conclusions about the respective presence or absence of obligation. I find that fair play fails to provide an account of obligation (including political obligation) that provides a useful alternative to consent. Consent remains the driving force behind “fair play” obligations.
  
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