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  Briefing on Meeting with Ambassador Elbrick

  By Jacquelyn Chorush
   In a briefing on January 25^th 1966, President Lyndon B. Johnson was urged to receive Yugoslav Ambassador Burke Elbrick. Francis Bator, Special Assistant to the president, relays strong advice from Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Secretary Rusk explains that meeting with Ambassador Elbrick would be  “useful” in maintaining relations with Yugoslav leader, Joseph Tito. Rusk reasons, “for a communist, Tito has been increasingly sensible and sympathetic to our situation in Vietnam.”
  
  The Johnson Administration had taken an interest in Tito precisely because he advocated for non-alignment, meaning that he resisted supporting either the US or Soviet Union during the Cold War. Perceived as a more neutral communist, Tito had the potential to act as a mediator in Vietnam.[1] Tito was a potential exit strategy for the US, and Secretary of State Rusk was fully aware of the growing quagmire in Vietnam. 
  
  This was especially important as Johnson, and the Vietnam War were coming under increasing scrutiny. Early in the US involvement in Vietnam, activists were open and vocal, but represented only a small minority of Americans. But by 1965, the general American public had lost significant support of the war.[2] Less than two weeks before Bator delivered his briefing, TIME Magazine released an issue on “The U.S. Peace Offensive and the Communist Response.”[3] The rhetoric of the “peace offensive” is particularly ironic in the context of US-Yugoslav diplomacy regarding Vietnam.
  
  In April of 1966, Tito explained the two necessary steps for the US to reach a peace settlement with Vietnam: the US must cease bombing “for an indefinite period” and be willing to negotiate with the National Liberation Front.[4] The National Liberation Front, commonly known as the Viet Cong, was identified by the US as its communist adversary during the Vietnam War.  It is striking that the Johnson administration considered him to be curiously “sensible and sympathetic” to the US and its involvement in the war. But Tito’s two steps perfectly embody a genuine diplomatic effort to resolve conflict. The US did not pursue these terms.
  
  Walter Roberts, stationed at the Belgrade Embassy, recounts a 1965 meeting between himself, Harriman, and Tito in Yugoslavia. The meeting was tense and Roberts had a strong feeling it would be “unproductive.” But the US needed a positive relationship with the Yugoslav leader.[5] Suddenly, Tito inquired as to Harriman’s age—73—the same age as Tito; Tito got up and left the room, only to return with a 73-year-old bottle of wine. The meeting ended up being so successful that Ambassador Elrick turned to Harriman and asked for a telegram to be sent to Johnson on the success of the meeting. Shortly after, Johnson received the briefing from Bator. Ironically, Tito appears to have been a model diplomat during the war, and in the context of Bator’s briefing throws into question how “sensible and sympathetic” his US equivalent was.  

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  [1] Stanciu, Cezar. “Fragile Equilibrium.” 173.

  [2] Williams, Yohuru. “Vietnam War Protests.”

  [3] Time Magazine. http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19660114,00.html

  [4] Stanciu, Cezar. “Fragile Equilibium.” 173-4.

  [5] Roberts, Walter. “In Vino Veritas.” Interview. ADST.org. http://adst.org/2014/12/in-vino-veritas/#.WibvwbQ-eSM.
  
   References
   
  Stanciu, Cezar. "Fragile Equilibrium." Journal Of Cold War Studies 18, no. 1 (Winter2016 2016): 161-187. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed December 5, 2017).
   
  Williams, Yohuru. “Vietnam War Protests.” History.com. 2017. http://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war/vietnam-war-protests.
   
  Roberts, Walter. “In Vino Veritas.” Interview. ADST.org. http://adst.org/2014/12/in-vino-veritas/#.WibvwbQ-eSM.