In discussion of the research conducted by Botero et al. the last chapter noted the promising, yet difficult situation of wide-scale research being conducted in CSR. Although his research does not belong to this category, Frachetti’s chronologically long view of development in the region, and his interest in modeling cultural evolutionary processes, echoes work being done in CSR. Although studies like that conducted by Botero et al. don’t offer the kind of reliability or substantiation needed to address the specific inquiry of this dissertation, they, like Frachetti’s theory, may offer insights into understanding some of the species-level processes underlying the “origins” of “Religion” within particular environmental contexts. Similarly, many theories generated in CSR are too general for the scale of case studies considered in the present investigation, but a few seems to have implications that seem applicable.

In Philosophy in the Flesh, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson emphasize the interaction of physical human bodies in the world on the development and functions of “embodied” human minds.¹ Lakoff and Johnson argue that the physical reality of minds-in-brains-in-bodies-in-environments creates various opportunities and limits that structure the way human minds engage in conceptual processes.² Their “Embodied Mind Theory” is presented in contrast to notions of mind-body dualism and distinctions between processes of “perception” and “conception.”³ They write, “findings of cognitive science are profoundly disquieting in two respects. First, they tell us that human reason is a form of animal reason, a reason inextricably tied to our bodies and peculiarities of our brains. Second, these results tell us that our bodies, brains, and interactions with our environment provide the mostly unconscious basis for our everyday metaphysics, that is, our sense of what is real.”⁴ Lakoff and Johnson highlight a connection between environments and concepts that underlies the investigation taken up in this dissertation. It is important to point out that they do not merely understand the physical surroundings as a container for bodies and embodied minds, but as a context for the creative processes of those minds. They observe that these surroundings “provide the mostly unconscious basis for our everyday metaphysics, that is, our sense of what is real.”⁵

In “Brain, Body, and Culture” Armin Geertz applies the notion of the “embodied mind” to theorizing on the origins of “Religion.”⁶ He outlines a “Biocultural Theory of Religion” that attempts to describe the interaction between physical and cultural factors that underlie processes of generation and development of “Religion.” Among these factors, Geertz includes concepts of the “embodied mind,” “extended cognition,” and the “distribution of cognition.”⁷ He writes, 

[In] terms of a biocultural theory of religion, embrainment and embodiment are key factors. This means that cognition functions in the context of embodied brains.…[So too] extension and situatedness are key factors. A constitutive instrument in the extension of mind are the tools of all sorts that assist us in a variety of ways to harness fleeting ideas and to function effectively in cognitive networks….[So too] distribution and enculturation are key factors.  Cognition is distributed in networks of feelings, memories and knowledge. The mechanism that is inimical to this ability is deep enculturation, driven by the communicative needs of communities of brains.⁸

Like Frachetti, Geertz attempts to articulate complex processes of cultural development in consideration of physical variables. For Frachetti, the physical variables are ultimately environmental; for Geertz they are associated with human bodies. Although his “Biocultural Theory of Religion” is aimed at explaining this interaction across the entire species, Geertz’s concept offers an important reminder for this investigation: both individual minds and the interactions between those minds, in groups, are influenced by environmental factors. Geertz points to the importance of communication and distribution of cognition/culture, recalling the evolutionary advantage of human social development.⁹

Like Frachetti and Geertz, Ara Norenzayan offers insights on the significance of social interactions (and inter-group competition) to the development of religions. In Big Gods, Norenzayan argues that processes of cultural evolution have selected for “pro-social” religions that promote intra-group cooperation in order to outcompete other groups.¹⁰ He focuses this research on the development and spread of “supernatural monitoring” as a means of promoting pro-social cooperation. This is outlined in his eight “rules” of “Big Gods” as “1. Watched people are nice people./ 2. Religion is more in the situation than in the person./ 3. Hell is stronger than heaven./ 4. Trust people who trust in God./ 5. Religious actions speak louder than words./ 6. Unworshipped Gods are impotent Gods./ 7. Big Gods for Big Groups./ 8. Religious groups cooperate in order to compete.”¹¹ Like Lakoff, Johnson, and Geertz, Norenzayan understands cultural (or religious) concepts to be products of biological evolutionary processes – thus subject to selective pressures exerted by both physical and social environments. Although Norenzayan’s argument is instructive with regard to the significance of cultural evolution in the development of religions, the seventh of his eight “rules” is does not appear tenable in light of this dissertation: “Big Gods for Big Groups”.¹² Chapter Four (“Mobile Pastoralism”) argues that the populations of societies out of which the worship of YHWH or Ahura Mazda seem to have arisen must have been, by ecological necessity, rather small compared to the “great civilizations” of neighboring regions. By examining the worship of these deities in the modern world as “religions deemed monotheism,” this dissertation points to the fact that these deities (and the religions that claim them) exemplify what Botero et al. appear to mean when referring to societies with beliefs in “moralizing high gods”.¹³ In contrast, it seems clear that Norenzayan, like Botero et al., uses modern Christian and Muslim conceptions of “God” to help construct his (very similar) notion of “Big Gods”. 

The difference in aims, approaches, and disciplinary grounding are likely the cause for divergent conclusions. The research taken up in this dissertation: is aimed at understanding the “origins” of two particular ancient religions; is based on historical and archaeological data; and is conducted from the perspective of Religious Studies (a discipline defined, according to Taves, by an object of study).¹⁴ In contrast, Norenzayan’s research: is aimed at explaining the cause and function of a specific religious phenomenon; is based on modern cognitive science data; and is conducted from the perspective of Psychology (a discipline defined, according to Taves, by a level of analysis).¹⁵ These differences also underlie the critique of Botero et al. in the last chapter: “universal” theories that are intended as historical explanation, but are based on experimental data from modern religions and participants, can be intriguing but problematic. Norenzayan writes, 

To get some answers, I will occasionally turn to religious texts, and to shamans, priests, and preachers. But more importantly, religion’s imprints on human nature are not so much found in dogmas in texts and teachings, but in natural religion—the thoughts and behaviors of believers. When teachings matter (they exist only in some religious groups and only in recent history), they matter only as lived interpretations and understandings by believers. Therefore the bulk of my attention will be on recent empirical studies from psychology, economics, sociology, and anthropology, where the actual behavior of people can be carefully observed in everyday life or under controlled conditions.¹⁶

It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to unpack and evaluate each of the various claims (and assumptions) made in these few lines, but it is important to highlight the modern sources informing his conclusions. Despite the issues identified with this aspect of his work, Norenzayan offers an interesting perspective on some of the processes that might underlie the generation and development of “religions deemed monotheistic.”

In “Conclusion: On Keeping Cognitive Science of Religion Cognitive and Cultural” Justin Barrett lauds the progress that researchers in the nascent sub-field of CSR have made in recent decades, but warns against focusing too much attention on individual cognition.¹⁷ He writes, “CSR should reserve a special place for considering how human minds work such that humans entertain and communicate certain types of thoughts that become so widespread and stable as to become cultural. That is, at once CSR should remember that individual minds matter but that the primary target of explanation of religion is not that of individual cognition but of group-level cultural expression.”¹⁸ Barrett’s reminder is an important methodological note for this dissertation – one that is quite easy to observe with regard to such ancient religions. Due to the limited information and evidence available, what can be understood of the ancient worship of YHWH or Ahura Mazda can just be described at the level of community. Chapter Eight (“People (and Texts) Deemed Religious”), examines literary narratives of individual “prophet-founders” that appear to serve as expressions of, and tools for building, communities of worship.