In the published remarks from her “2010 Presidential Address” to the American Academy of Religion (AAR), Taves highlights her experience with this phenomenon in panel discussions responding to her 2009 book.¹ She writes, “In these conversations, I was repeatedly questioned about my position and point of view; at times, I felt as if I was supposed to adopt a fixed position with respect to a series of binaries: scientific or post-modernist, critic or caretaker, and religious or nonreligious.”² Taves shares this experience in an apparent effort to highlight the fact that such “binaries” oversimplify and artificially flatten a complex field of study. Citing a study conducted by the AAR, Taves notes, “Among other things, according to the report, we agree that the religious studies major is, by its very nature, intercultural, comparative, and multidisciplinary.”³ This observation does not alleviate scholars of the burden of responsibility to account for their claims, but it does offer insight into why researchers engaged in the study of “Religion” might disagree regarding the standards of discourse and scholarship. Taves argues that this is connected to the relationship of scholars of “Religion” to the objects of their research: unlike “disciplines defined by a level of analysis, such as physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, and sociology” Religious Studies is “a discipline that is defined by its object of study.”⁴ A key difference (and one that is pertinent to this dissertation) is the way in which “Theory” and “Method” are regarded in each category. Whereas disciplines like Physics and Biology, Taves suggests, “bring common methods and theoretical assumptions to a range of phenomena at a specific level of analysis,” Political Science and Religious Studies “borrow whatever seems useful relative to our subject matter from wherever we can find it.”⁵ This insight is critical to understanding the inevitable (and seemingly indomitable) exercise of defining “Religion.” 

It is important to highlight what appears to be a connection between the common struggle (and disagreement) to define the object of study within Religious Studies and the prevalence of concerns regarding scholarly positionality and religious perspective. The common goal of these efforts seems to be one of agreement or unity – and perhaps one of functioning more like disciplines of the other category. It is not difficult to imagine a line of thinking that might motivate this goal: if “we” can come to some agreement (or standards) regarding perspectives, and thus (one assumes) approaches, then “we” might focus collective attention on the most important possible objects of study. Framed this way, the pressure Taves experienced, to categorize herself among the binary options, may make sense; allowing for alternative options or holding multiple positions might not. 

This is cogent to the discussion at hand because this investigation assumes a pragmatically agnostic perspective. Although the approach of this dissertation is best described as “naturalistic,” it cannot offer an opinion regarding “Truth” claims that encompass or specifically allow for the perspective assumed in this examination. In order to investigate the influence of environments on the generation of “religions,” one must make some claims regarding the nature of the development of these institutions. This research assumes: 1) that “religions” originate, develop, and function within human societies; 2) that human beings evolved within natural environmental contexts and continue to be affected by their surroundings (natural and artificial); 3) these environmental contexts, themselves, developed subject to evolutionary processes. At a glance these claims might offer the impression that this work precludes any religious “Truth” claims, but this is not the case. It is not the intention (nor obligation) of this work to validate or disprove such claims; it is, however, the responsibility of this dissertation to consider various perspectives on this inquiry and offer remarks on its position with regard to alternative paths. It seems logical that the present inquiry can be understood and accommodated by various religious and non-religious perspectives. Consider a few claims that are not made by the three assumptions offered above. 

First, this work does not make any “ultimate” claims regarding the nature of the universe within which evolutionary processes function and environmental contexts develop. Although there appears to be a lot of productive tension to be harnessed in the passionate debates regarding topics such as “the nature of creation” or “the origin of the universe,” this dissertation is not the place for such discussions. This investigation takes, as a fundamental premise, the existence and functions of physical laws and biological processes, including natural selection; however, it should be clear that the means by which these laws were set in motion is yet left open for debate elsewhere.

Second, this dissertation has not made (and will not make) any comprehensive claims regarding the constituent parts of the environmental contexts on which this research is focused. To some readers this may sound needlessly ambiguous, but it is only reasonable to point out the impossibility of identifying all animate and inanimate elements present in any ancient landscape. The task of cataloguing all matter in any modern region seems overwhelming, if not impossible due to the fact of so much potential data and the extant data concerning ancient landscapes is abysmally small by comparison. Chapter Five (“Agriculturally Marginal Landscapes”) will examine the environmental category, as it is conceived for this investigation, at a geographic scale that virtually precludes the possibility of accounting for all life (let alone inanimate elements) in such zones. This situation “leaves the door open” to any number of “Truth” claims regarding the presence of life within these landscapes. This is not to say “anything is possible” but merely to point out the fact that this investigation cannot account for “all creatures great and small” that may have lived in the environmental contexts under examination. Such assumptions, underlying this investigation, allow a reader to have a perspective, like one proposed by Jürgen Moltmann in his book God in Creation for example, that describes the environmental contexts in which these religions developed as ultimately populated by one or more deities.⁶ Like “Truth” claims regarding the generation and development of the universe, perspectives like Moltmann’s may be subject to debate, but this dissertation is not the venue for such discussions.

Third, these assumptions do not claim understanding of (nor that it is possible to understand) all of the variables that contribute to the origins, development, or functions of religions (or “Religion”) in societies. This investigation is aimed at examining one of these variables with the understanding that it cannot be the only one. Furthermore, although much research conducted under the umbrella of the cognitive science of religion (CSR) appears to be aimed at identifying universal human predispositions toward “Religion” as an emergent phenomenon, it cannot be said, as of this writing, that scholars have produced any comprehensive explanations of “how” or “why” Homo sapiens came to generate or develop all things considered religious. The cognitive “mechanisms” hypothesized in answer to questions of “why” and “how” are compelling, useful, and still rather newly formed. This dissertation acknowledges that “Truth” claims, offered in answer to these questions, suggesting processes that include (among other features) “revelation,” “divine inspiration,” or human creativity may offer readers different perspectives, research models, or insights with which to approach the current investigation.