“We can understand monotheism of the revolutionary, exclusive kind only by understanding the polytheistic religion against which it is pitted. For this monotheism did not evolve organically from polytheism, but broke with it by denouncing it as pagan.”¹

Following the last chapter, which outlined Taves' "Building Block Approach” and its applicability to this investigation, the title of the current chapter is adapted from the same “ascriptive formulation:” rather than discussing “monotheistic religions,” this discussion will consider the category into which fall the respective worship of YHWH and Ahura Mazda as “religions deemed monotheistic.”² Although the usage of this formulation is a bit of a departure from Taves’ original suggestion, it refers more precisely to the category of religions implied in scholarly discourse on “monotheism.” This category appears to be defined by a set of certain building blocks that serve as referents for usage of the term “monotheism.” This dissertation will show that the presence or absence of certain building blocks in this set can be traced to the agriculturally marginal landscapes that contextualized the communities of worship centered around YHWH and Ahura Mazda.

In Of God and Gods, Jan Assmann highlights the significance of “monotheism” to the discussion of religion in the modern world: “The atrocities of the twentieth century—including the horrors of September 11, 2001—have lent a tremendous resonance to the sacred texts of our monotheistic tradition.  It is impossible to speak of religion, especially with a focus on violence, without thinking of and referring to the Holocaust and/or to the events of 9/11. It is therefore of prime importance to make clear at the outset, before broaching the subject of monotheism, that the atrocities of the twentieth century did not stem from but rather were directed against monotheism.”³ Assmann’s observations point to the importance of acknowledging that for many people, in and outside of academic circles, discussions of monotheism are loaded with historical and political baggage. A survey of the literature on these concepts suggests that discussion on the topic of “monotheism” is growing stale (possibly because of this baggage). This dissertation is not another stone lobbed into that discussion: the current investigation is concerned with the origins of two specific “religions deemed monotheistic,” not necessarily with the conceptual development of terms like “mono-,” “poly-,” or “henotheism.” In an echo of the endless project of defining “Religion,” contributions to this discourse appear to rely on re-defining “monotheism” or nuancing previous definitions with new terminology (i.e. “kathenotheism” or “monotheiotheism”) as means of intervention.⁴ This chapter will show that these terms, like “monotheism,” appear to be used as a shorthand in the larger discussion of the differences between categories of “religions deemed monotheistic” and “religions deemed polytheistic.” Further, it seems that this discussion is part of the ongoing narratives of differentiation and competition that are integral to religions deemed monotheistic. 

In order to understand the category of “religions deemed monotheistic,” this chapter is divided into three connected discussions on: “religions,” “deemed,” and “monotheistic.” This approach is borrowed from Schneider’s An Introduction to Ancient Mesopotamian Religion, in which she writes, “[The] title of this book, while simple, is relevant to what will and will not be covered in the following volume.  I will begin by going over each element of the title because the definition of the different parts lays the groundwork for what to expect in the following text.”⁵ Without using an explicit method, Taves appears to divide Religious Experience Reconsidered in a similar fashion: “The argument unfolds in chapters devoted to religion, experience, explanation, and comparison.”⁶ It must be emphasized that Schneider’s approach highlights the significance of Taves’ ascriptive formulation. Focusing each section of this investigation on a word in the name of this category (and chapter), draws out insights specific to that topic that have implications for our understanding of the category. It is important to note that any one of these topics would be a massive undertaking for anyone seeking a comprehensive treatment of “religion,” “deeming,” or “monotheism.” Recognizing that the goal of this chapter is to serve the larger inquiry of this dissertation, not an exhaustive examination of any of these three areas, each section raises points that seem cogent to the matter at hand, offering insight on both topic and the category of “religions deemed monotheistic.”