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  Liquor Lost the Yugoslav Coup

  By Casey Roberts
  “Loose lips sink ships!” was a common World War II era slogan that underscored the importance of sound operational security. Fearing few slips in judgement having great and lasting impact is not an uncommon fear in times of turmoil, and in 1966 Yugoslavia, the same rang true. According to a declassified Central Intelligence Agency document, an attempted Yugoslav coup d’état was foiled because of three major lapses in judgement.
  
  Following the establishment of the Yugoslav non-alignment doctrine, Josip Broz Tito leveraged his international standing and statesmanship to help garner national support and legitimacy. Maintaining non-alignment in the Cold War era proved troubling for Tito not only in the international arena, but according to the CIA, also domestically. The CIA memo “Intelligence Information Cable” from August 13, 1966 details the secret interactions of the former Yugoslav Vice President, Aleksandar Rankovic, and his followers planning to seize presidential power. According to the cable, Rankovic and his supporters planned to take over the Yugoslavian Presidency while Tito was out of the country, a plan that had been in the making for over four years; however, the plan eventually foiled because it became too widespread information.
  
  The memo discusses the Yugoslav Internal Affairs report that lists three different situations in which former Vice President Rankovic was mentioned as the next heir apparent for the country. Most interesting and best documented was the drunken remark made by the former Assistant Director of Internal Affairs, General Sakota, at a Moscow banquet, in which he mentioned Rankovic as the new, legitimate president of the Yugoslavian Republic. The Yugoslav Ambassador to the Soviet Union overheard this inebriated comment and obviously reported it to the Department of Internal Affairs, which already had two other instances of similar rumblings documented. In essence, this provided another piece of anecdotal evidence of Rankovic’s intentions.
  
  It was not simply one instance of a liquored former-bureaucrat that led to the failure of Rankovic’s attempted coup. Ultimately the coup did not unfold due to a combination of factors. Without the drunken ramblings at a Moscow banquet there might not have been enough evidence to fully support an investigation into Rankovic’s attempt to seize national power.