Technosense and Sensibilia: Haptic Interfaces, Selfhood, and Obstruction in Virtual RealityMain MenuIntroductionThe Cognitive Neuroscientific ApproachThe Threshold for Haptic EngagementMultisensory Experience and the Mistaken Body ProblemThe Danger of IllusionObstructionThe Theoretical ApproachSelfhood and the SensesHaptic EngagementThe Experience of Virtual RealityConclusionsWorks CitedJustin Gil94c47de2aaac7843570bcc43b3442787b5fca97e
Bodily Prosthesis
12016-05-03T12:13:39-07:00Justin Gil94c47de2aaac7843570bcc43b3442787b5fca97e95543plain2016-05-05T00:51:34-07:00Justin Gil94c47de2aaac7843570bcc43b3442787b5fca97eTo what extent can virtual reality extend the illusion of bodily prosthesis? Summarizing a number of studies, Gallace and Spence observe in order that: (1) Embodiment can occur from a “mislocalization of the real arm toward the position” of an artificial arm as signaled through proprioceptive drift and questionnaire procedures (191) (2) Virtual arms, as the test case, need not even be aligned with the actual location of the arm, nor need they resemble exactly the dimensions of a real arm. “The plasticity of our neural system allows for the incorporation within our body representations of virtual objects or prosthesis that even break the more conventional rules of human anatomy” so long as “the perceived connectivity between the arm and the rest of the body” and “synchronous visuotactile stimulation” are maintained (191) (3) “People’s interoceptive sensitivity—that is, their ability to perceive signals as coming from their own body—predicts the malleability of the representation of their own body” through an inverse relation (the less one is aware of interoceptive signals, the more able they are to buy into the illusion of virtual embodiment) (191).