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1. 1 2015-03-03T16:11:39-08:00 Alli Crandell 26f9545f299f61a2533da548ca9496fbcfdde47d Observations: Corporeal 4 text 2015-03-30T17:22:32-07:00 Alli Crandell 26f9545f299f61a2533da548ca9496fbcfdde47d

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• 1 2015-03-03T16:11:39-08:00 Observations: Corporeal 4 text 2015-03-30T17:22:32-07:00 1. Of Humane Sense and Perception. BEfore I deliver my observations up∣on that part of Philosophy which is call'd Experimental, I thought it necessary to premise some discourse concerning the Perception of Hu∣mane Sense. It is known that man has five Exterior Senses, and every sense is ignorant of each other; for the Nose knows not what the Eyes see, nor the Eyes what the Ears hear, neither do the Ears know what the Tongue tastes; and as for Touch, although it is a general Sense, yet every several part of the body has a several touch, and each part is ignorant of each others touch: And thus there is a general igno∣rance of all the several parts, and yet a perfect know∣ledg in each part; for the Eye is as knowing as the Ear, and the Ear as knowing as the Nose, and the Nose as knowing as the Tongue, and one particular Touch knows as much as another, at least is capable thereof: Nay, not onely every several Touch, Taste, Smell, Sound or Sight, is a several knowledg by it self, but each of them has as many particular knowledges or perceptions as there are objects presented to them: Be∣sides, there are several degrees in each particular sense; As for example, some Men (I will not speak of other animals) their perception of sight, taste, smell, touch, or hearing, is quicker to some sorts of objects, then to others, according either to the perfection or imper∣fection, or curiosity or purity of the corporeal figura∣tive motions of each sense, or according to the presen∣tation of each object proper to each sense; for if the presentation of the objects be imperfect, either through variation or obscurity, or any other ways, the sense is deluded. Neither are all objects proper for one sense, but as there are several senses, so there are se∣veral sorts of objects proper for each several sense. Now if there be such variety of several knowledges, not onely in one Creature, but in one sort of sense; to wit, the exterior senses of one humane Creature; what may there be in all the parts of Nature? 'Tis true, there are some objects which are not at all perceptible by any of our exterior senses; as for example, rari∣fied air, and the like: But although they be not sub∣ject to our exterior sensitive perception, yet they are subject to our rational perception, which is much pu∣rer and subtiler then the sensitive; nay, so pure and subtil a knowledg, that many believe it to be immate∣rial, as if it were some God, when as it is onely a pure, fine and subtil figurative Motion or Perception; it is so active and subtil, as it is the best informer and reformer of all sensitive Perception; for the rational Matter is the most prudent and wisest part of Nature, as being the designer of all productions, and the most pious and devoutest part, having the perfectest notions of God, I mean, so much as Nature can possibly know of God; so that whatsoever the sensitive Perception is either de∣fective in, or ignorant of, the rational Perception sup∣plies. But mistake me not: by Rational Perception and Knowledg, I mean Regular Reason, not Irregu∣lar; where I do also exclude Art, which is apt to de∣lude sense, and cannot inform so well as Reason doth; for Reason reforms and instructs sense in all its actions: But both the rational and sensitive knowledg and per∣ception being divideable as well as composeable, it causes ignorance as well as knowledg amongst Natures Creatures; for though Nature is but one body, and has no sharer or copartner, but is intire and whole in it self, as not composed of several different parts or sub∣stances, and consequently has but one Infinite natural knowledg and wisdom, yet by reason she is also divide∣able and composeable, according to the nature of a body, we can justly and with all reason say, That, as Nature is divided into infinite several parts, so each se∣veral part has a several and particular knowledg and perception, both sensitive and rational, and again that each part is ignorant of the others knowledg and per∣ception; when as otherwise, considered altogether and in general, as they make up but one infinite body of Nature, so they make also but one infinite general knowledg. And thus Nature may be called both In∣dividual, as not having single parts subsisting without her, but all united in one body; and Divideable, by reason she is partable in her own several corporeal fi∣gurative motions, and not otherwise; for there is no Vacuum in Nature, neither can her parts start or re∣move from the Infinite body of Nature, so as to sepa∣rate themselves from it, for there's no place to flee to, but body and place are all one thing, so that the parts of Nature can onely joyn and disjoyn to and from parts, but not to and from the body of Nature. And since Nature is but one body, it is intirely wise and knowing, ordering her self-moving parts with all facility and ease, without any disturbance, living in pleasure and delight, with infinite varieties and curiosities, such as no single Part or Creature of hers can ever attain to. 2. Of Art, and Experimental Philosophy. SOme are of opinion, That by Art there can be a reparation made of the Mischiefs and Imperfections mankind has drawn upon it self by negligence and intem∣perance, and a wilful and superstitious deserting the Pre∣scripts and Rules of Nature, whereby every man, both from a derived Corruption, innate and born with him, and from his breediug and converse with men, is very subject to slip into all sorts of Errors. But the all-powerful God, and his servant Nature, know, that Art, which is but a particular Creature, cannot inform us of the Truth of the Infinite parts of Nature, being but finite it self; for though every Creature has a double per∣ception, rational and sensitive, yet each creature or part has not an Infinite perception; nay, although each particular creature or part of Nature may have some conceptions of the Infinite parts of Nature, yet it can∣not know the truth of those Infinite parts, being but a finite part it self, which finiteness causes errors in Perceptions; wherefore it is well said, when they con∣fess themselves, That the uncertainty and mistakes of humane actions proceed either from the narrowness and wandring of our senses, or from the slipperiness or delusion of our memory, or from the confinement or rashness of our understandiug. But, say they, It is no wonder that our power over natural Causes and Effects is so slowly im∣proved, seeing we are not onely to contend with the obscu∣rity and difficulty of the things whereon we work and think, but even the forces of our minds conspire to betray us: And these being the dangers in the process of Humane Rea∣son, the remedies can onely proceed from the Real, the Mechanical, the Experimental Philosophy, which hath this advantage over the Philosophy of discourse and dis∣putation, That whereas that chiefly aims at the subtilty of its deductions and conclusions, without much regard to the first ground-work, which ought to be well laid on the sense and memory, so this intends the right ordering of them all, and making them serviceable to each other. In which discourse I do not understand, first, what they mean by our power over natural causes and effects; for we have no power at all over natural causes and effects, but onely one particular effect may have some power over another, which are natural actions; but neither can natural causes nor effects be over-powred by man so, as if man was a degree above Nature, but they must be as Nature is pleased to order them; for Man is but a small part, and his powers are but particular actions of Nature, and therefore he cannot have a supreme and absolute power. Next, I say, That Sense, which is more apt to be deluded then Reason, cannot be the ground of Reason, no more then Art can be the ground of Nature: Wherefore discourse shall sooner find or trace Natures corporeal figurative motions, then de∣luding Arts can inform the Senses; For how can a Fool order his understanding by Art, if Nature has made it defective? or how can a wise man trust his sen∣ses, if either the objects be not truly presented accord∣ing to their natural figure and shape, or if the senses be defective, either through age, sickness, or other accidents, which do alter the natural motions proper to each sense? And hence I conclude, that Experimental and Mecha∣nick Philosophy cannot be above the Speculative part, by reason most Experiments have their rise from the Speculative, so that the Artist or Mechanick is but a servant to the Student.