Detroit Become Human Main Menu

Meet Your Maker

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The elusive Kamski is a representation of the current robotics industry and where it is projected to head. In terms of the game, "becoming human", much like today's robotics industry, associates this internal emotinal structure with the capacity for empathy and being human. It's focus is on the ability of the internally social machine to recognize itself and the other, and base it's actions off that knowledge.  His understanding of robotics and aritificial intelligence is epitimized in his encounter with Connor, whereby he asks Connor to shoot the Chloe robot he has just been introduced to, execution style. This is the game's evolution of the Teuring test, and the variation proposed in Ex Machina, that attempts to move beyond the human-centric to a posthuman test of the android's ability for internal empathy. Whereas Chloe, the first model created by Kamski, is created with a focus on external empathy whereby the robot "fools" the human into believing the robot has feelings, this test is to see if Connor has the desired "authentic" internal emotional structures to acknowledge, if not mistakenly, Chloe as an other worthy of emotional response. (Duchoumel, 105-112) The game itself continues this theme by eventually administering the Teuring test to the player, sometime after having completed the game.

However big a step this may be for extending this line of questioning, it never reaches a post anthropocentric view whereby it would include animal and other non human intelligences into what it means to be an emotional, intelligent aritificial intelligence. The goal of creating a sentient being is still very Frankenstien-ish, with human oriented goals and perspectives. Also it never questions whether emotion is inherent to authentic sentience, or if it's even "superior" to create machines that can think like humans. Really it never even gets to a theory as old as the mind/body dualism, which is Descartes concept that the universe and humans are automated machines so therefore the robots we create are not different from us but simply like a model of an organ or even a copy. (Wilson, 101)

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