Assmann points to the feature of “secondary religions” that seems to underlie this perspective as “Truth.” He writes, “What all of these religions have in common is an emphatic concept of truth. They all rest on a distinction between true and false religion, proclaiming a truth that does not stand in a complementary relationship to other truths, but consigns all traditional or rival truths to the realm of falsehood.”¹ This is a fairly prominent component of religions deemed monotheistic in the modern world and appears integral to the potential for proselytization referenced by de Jong above. Although there does not seem to be any certainty as to which came first, it seems reasonable to draw a connection between this “emphatic concept of truth” and the separation of ethnic and religious identities. Considering the global spread of Islam and Christianity over the last thousand years, it is easy to see how an exclusive claim of (and on) “Truth” can facilitate the conversion of people with various social or “ethnic” identities.

Although he does not use the language of Taves’ “Building Block Approach” (though such a framework would strengthen his work) Assmann argues that this feature of “secondary religions” is connected to a building block of religions discussed above: texts deemed religious. He writes, “This exclusive truth is something genuinely new, and its novel, exclusive and exclusionary character is clearly reflected in the manner in which it is communicated and codified. It claims to have been revealed to humankind once and for all, since no path of merely human fashioning could have led from the experiences accumulated over countless generations to this goal; and it has been deposited in a canon of sacred texts, since no cult or rite would have been capable of preserving this revealed truth down the ages.”² The significance of “the Book” to the proselytization efforts of Protestant sects of Christianity is a well-established fact in the 21^stcentury and requires no more proof than a visit to any hotel room in the United States. It is important to understand that although the unit of “building block” is considered, for purposes of discussion, in isolation in this analysis, in reality, they appear to function together in complex ways to form religions deemed monotheistic.

As noted above, Assmann identifies the other side of this perspective as one of “looking down” on other religions, particularly those deemed polytheistic (or “primary” in Assmann’s words). He argues, “Even though they may have assimilated many elements of primary religions in the course of a ‘syncretistic acculturation,’ they are still marked in their self-understanding by an ‘antagonistic acculturation,’ and they have strong ideas about what is incompatible with the truth (or orthodoxy) they proclaim.”³ However problematic this appears to have proven in the histories of Christian and Muslim conquests, the notion of “incompatibility” does seem to be a logical consequence of this “emphatic concept of Truth.” When compared to ancient Greek, Egyptian, or Mesopotamian religions (often the paragons of religions deemed polytheistic in the ancient world) the presence of this feature as a building block in religions deemed monotheistic becomes quite obvious. Although no one can speak to the lived experiences or thought-processes of ancient individuals, it is easy enough to use what information is available to imagine that the complex and apparently integral connections between markers of identity would make it illogical for someone with non-Greek political, ethnic, and cultural identities could assume a Greek religious identity. Rather, as Assmann points out, the syncretistic tendency of religions deemed polytheistic stands out in stark contrast to the notion of “incompatibility” he identifies in religions deemed monotheistic.⁴

The contrast between patterns of syncretistic alignment of deities, a sort of ultimate religious “compatibility,” and the pattern of identifying and confronting “incompatibility” identified by Assmann, leads him to use the term “counterreligion” to describe “secondary religions.”⁵ He writes, “The truth derives its depth, its clear contours, and its capacity to orient and direct action from this antagonistic energy, and from the sure knowledge of what is incompatible with the truth. These new religions can therefore perhaps be characterized most adequately by the term “counterreligion.”⁶ Assmann’s usage of the term points to the assumption underlying much of the discourse on “monotheism:” this category of religions is “new” or fundamentally different from the religions of “old.” Most interestingly, it seems that the narratives of “incompatibility” integral to religions deemed monotheistic have succeeded, historically, in setting up and reinforcing the distinction between those religions of the “old” type and those that belong to this “new” category.