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  Yugoslav Fears and Pleas Following the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia

  By Ellery Cushman 
  After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia following the brief period of liberalization known as the Prague Spring, Yugoslavia was understandably apprehensive about the possibility that the Soviet Union could turn their attention to their increasingly market-oriented reforms next. During this time, the Vice President of the Federal Executive Council of Yugoslavia, Kiro Gligorov, traveled to Washington D.C. to discuss the U.S. – Yugoslav relations with American leadership. A memorandum to President Johnson, dated October 4, 1968, registered the Yugoslav anxiety, stating that, “[t]he Yugoslavs – from Tito down – have condemned [the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia] and are worried that they are the Romanians may be next.”
  
  In 1968, the Prague Spring, also known as “Communism with a Human Face” under Alexander Dubček, resulted in the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact countries. Similar reforms, largely as an attempt to move away from the leadership of Moscow, were also underway in Yugoslavia and Romania. Whereas Yugoslavia’s “Third Way” had separated Tito from the USSR since 1948, post-1956 efforts in Romania under Ceausescu had attempted to release Romania from the control of Moscow.
  
  Because the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia was an attempt to halt attempted independence, Yugoslavia and Romania feared that they would be invaded next as a result of their more liberal reforms and attempted separation from the USSR. The memo makes it clear that Tito, and other Yugoslav leaders, are not only worried about their own independence and security, but also that of Romania. Arguably, having a Romania that is separated from Moscow would open it up to influence from Tito and Yugoslavia, prompting the establishment of a true ‘third way.’ If Tito could recruit other Eastern European Communist countries, he could create a greater sphere of influence that would include Communist countries that were more open to relations with Western countries and market-oriented reforms.
  
  What I found especially interesting was that Gligorov was not asking the Johnson Administration for a pledge of military assistance in case of a Soviet invasion, but rather, economic assistance to build a market economy. Katzenbach responded to Gligorov by saying he “could make no promises, [but that the U.S. was] prepared to look sympathetically at any specific suggestions they might have in the economic field.”  This is a curious response because having Communist countries more open to relations with Western nations would ultimately have weakened the Soviet Union, elevating the U.S. to a true global hegemon.