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  Foreign Scholars and American Academia During the Vietnam War: A Balancing Act

  By Nick Hemlock
  In 1968, the United States involvement in the Vietnam War generated criticism from civil rights groups, college students and other Americans from all walks of life. Similarly, protests resonated abroad in countries like Yugoslavia where student protests in Belgrade rallied against American action in Southeast Asia. A January 1968 White House Memorandum from Walt Rostow, the Special Assistant of National Security Affairs, to President Lyndon Baines Johnson (LBJ) addresses these issues of protest, academia, and Vietnam.
  
  In the memorandum, an upcoming lecture by Yugoslavian historian Vladimir Dedijer at MIT is the main area of concern for Rostow. Writing on behalf of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Provost Jerome Wiesner, Rostow states that although Dedijer “has promised our Consul in Zagreb that he will refrain from activities unconnected with his scholarly work,” MIT “has second thought” and Wiesner wanted to find out if the administration “would or would not grant him a visa.” Though Dedijer was no longer a member of the Yugoslav Communist Party, he had recently sent “a telegram to the National Liberation Front calling the U.S. Administration “the worst crooks in history, more cruel than Hitler.”” With this in mind, MIT wanted President Johnson to refuse his visa request so they could quietly push his lecture under the rug without outright revoking their invitation and cancelling his lecture.
  
  While Weisner and MIT took a stance that attempted to avoid confrontation and stave off criticism, the US Ambassador to Yugoslavia Charles Elbrick saw Dedijer’s visit as an opportunity for the Administration to win “some credit in the academic community for being broad-minded.” In the face of student protests and anti-Vietnam sentiment, allowing Dedijer to speak was framed as an action in which LBJ was considering the views of everyone in his decision-making. Elbrick’s recommendation for granting the visa is further rooted in the ideas of freedom of information and scholarly activity as well as maintaining a democratic reputation for the Administration. Elbrick stands alone among the supporters in the memorandum as Secretary of State Dean Rusk was “seized with the problem” and thus with a split opinion on the matter of Dedijer’s visit. Rostow composed this document in order to get advice of the President.
  
  This document presents a curious reversal in ideas and action in which an American university, MIT, is the actor seeking to quiet an opposing voice while a member of the American government is pushing for the preservation and platform of a more open and critical voice. Ambassador Elbrick was the person best suited to gauge a Yugoslav figure like Dedijer. His familiarity with Yugoslavia and its figures is apparent even in Rostow’s retelling of his view on the matter. This assured stance is at odds with the caution and confusion exhibited by high ranking members of the Johnson administration. The balancing act of the memorandum is a microcosm of a nation on edge during the Vietnam War overlaid with the greater tension of the Cold War.