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  The Strengthening of U.S.-Yugoslav Relations in the Aftermath of Prague Spring

  By Morgan Henson
  The Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia under Tito’s leadership prided itself on being a “nonaligned” country, meaning that it did not align itself with either the United States or the Soviet Union during the Cold War.  However, after the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968 during the “Prague Spring” incident, Yugoslavia became much more concerned with its own independence and began to look toward the United States as a guarantor of its sovereignty.
  
  In this collection of documents, the president’s inner circle was discussing whether or not President Johnson should officially meet with the Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Yugoslavia, Kiro Gligorov.  Unanimously, the men urged President Johnson to accept the request for a number of reasons, primary of which was that the official meeting would send a message to the Soviet Union that Yugoslavia was in conversation with the United States and would deter any further advance into the Mediterranean republic.  Not only this, the meeting would showcase U.S. cooperation with the nonaligned nations and demonstrate the United States’ ultimate goal of global democratic promotion.
  
  In preparation for the meeting, Walt Whitman Rostow, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, requested that his friend, M.I.T. professor Lincoln Bloomfield, write a summary of his recent experience in Yugoslavia, detailing the general public’s thoughts regarding U.S. assistance and intervention.  According to Mr. Bloomfield, there were two “vivid impressions” that President Johnson must understand: first, “an absolute determination to resist the Russians” and second, the explicit desire of “assistance from the United States in the event of trouble with the Russians.”  The presumption that the citizens of Yugoslavia would remain “nonaligned” was incorrect according to the Bloomfield’s account.   There was even a comment from the leadership that if Tito attempted to give in to Soviet forces, then the people would repudiate his leadership and fight the Soviets off themselves, expressing that they will “fight back with everything they have, retreat into the mountains, if necessary giving up half the country in the process, and fight on in a Vietnam-type war whether or not anyone helps them.”
  
  This shift in foreign policy signified the fragility of international relations and how quickly global dynamics may change.  The Republic of Yugoslavia was proud of their ‘nonaligned” policy, but as soon as the Soviet Union overstepped its boundaries Yugoslavia adjusted accordingly: in this case, it meant seeking out the United States as a stronger ally against a possible Soviet invasion.