Social Presence: “Being There” with Another
Alternative account of social knowing 2ndperson
In intersubjective contexts, visual perception of the face of the other is not equivalent to glancing at an object. It’s not a matter of me seeing the other’s face, simpliciter, but of seeing that the other sees me (or quiet literally, seeing the other seeing me). The fact that the other returns the gaze, and that this strongly registers in our perception (cf. Sartre, 1956; Stawarska, 2009), provides part of the basis for regarding the other not as mere object but as a perceiving subject—and carries with it ethical significance. The other’s gaze is precisely not something that can be subsumed into a strictly visual representation of eye direction since it has an affective impact on my own system that sets me up for further response. [gallagher]
Copresence picture (biocca)
Wobbly Table: http://vhil.stanford.edu/mm/2016/04/lee-iee-wobbly.pdf