Beyond the Boundaries of Fantasia: An ancient imagining of the future of leadership

Speed and Caesar's OODA loop (1:00)

The Roman statesman Cicero, usually a friend of Caesar, names 'luckiness' (felicitas) as one of the four attributes every good commander (imperator) must possess. The other three are knowledge of military affairs (scientia rei militaris), excellence in general but often with a masculine shade (virtus), and ability to get others to listen to you without necessarily having strictly defined legal powers to do so (auctoritas).

(As it happens, Cicero was talking about another general at the time -- Pompey, one-time son-in-law to Caesar and eventual rival (to the death). We've encountered Pompey earlier in this module.)

Apparently Caesar enjoyed both luck and skill. He was often called felix, which really means 'lucky' -- and he associated his luck with his divine ancestry (apparently he descended from Venus, the goddess of love), suggesting that his luck was more than mere accident. Appian, an Alexandrian historian writing about the Roman civil wars, calls Caesar 'aner epituchestatos es panta' -- 'a man who chanced most favorably in all things (App Bel Civ 2.21.149). Plutarch, whose biographical and philosophical writings on leadership appear several times in this course, composed an entire speech 'on the excellence (arete) and chance (tyche) of the Romans' and insists that Caesar was NOT successful by luck ALONE -- a deliberate (if somewhat measured) rebuttal of those who thought that Caesar (and the rest of the Romans) were just plain lucky. But Caesar never calls himself felix, even while inspiring his men by telling them that fortuna is on their side. Chance favors Caesar, but he is himself more than blessed by fate.

Caesar was also fast. On the march between battles, according to his own narrative, his men cover so much ground in a day that his enemies are often surprised at his army's arrival. In battle, as you'll see in the passage below, Caesar's unparalleled speed helps him win in at least two ways. In his own account, he so often reaches destinations unexpectedly soon and responds so quickly to changes in the battlefield situation that many scholars have found the stories of his speed (celeritas) impossible to believe. He probably spent more on mule transport in Gaul, presumably to lessen dependence on supply lines (and thereby untether his army), than any Roman general had spent before (Aulius Gellius, Attic Nights 15.4). Speed helps at a maximum in combat but also influences victory in non-military contexts, as this assignment will help clarify.

Listening for Leadership

Caesar, Civil War 3.93

But when our men on the giving of the signal, had run forward with javelins levelled and had observed that the Pompeians were not advancing against them, profiting by the experience they had gained in former battles, they spontaneously checked their speed and halted in about the middle of the space, so that they might not approach the foe with their vigour exhausted; and after a brief interval, again renewing their rapid advance, they discharged their javelins and quickly drew their swords, according to Caesar's directions. Nor indeed did the Pompeians fail to meet the emergency. For they parried the shower of missiles and withstood the attack of the legions without breaking their ranks, and after discharging their javelins had recourse to their swords. At the same time the horse on Pompeius' left wing, according to orders, charged in a body, and the whole multitude of archers poured forth. Our cavalry, failing to withstand their attack, gradually quitted their position and retired. Pompeius' cavalry pressed forward all the more eagerly, and deploying by squadrons began to surround our lines on their exposed flank. Caesar, observing it, gave the signal to his fourth line, which he had composed of six cohorts. These advanced rapidly and with colours flying attacked Pompeius' horse with such fury that not one of them stood his ground, and all, wheeling round, not only quitted the position but forthwith in hurried flight made for the highest hills. When these were dislodged all the archers and slingers, left defenceless, without support, were slain. With the same onslaught the cohorts surrounded the left wing, the Pompeians still fighting and continuing their resistance in their lines, and attacked them in the rear.

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