Speech of Socrates in Praise of Love
Translated by Seth Benardete
First some preliminary observations and questions:
This encounter with Socrates' dialectic will provide the framework for your reading of the Apology. Observe the following as he begins his promised contribution to the symposium:
• He praises the quality of the previous speech and claims that he is intimidated by having to follow such a presentation.
• He lowers the expectations of the audience and evokes their sympathy by asserting that he foolishly agreed to do something for which he now finds himself unprepared or unsuited. This is an example of Socratean εἰρωνεία (eirōneía), "dissimulation" or "feigned ignorance," from which we get the word "irony." In this case he claims two deficiencies: (1) an inadequate understanding of the topic itself, erotics; and (2) and a misunderstanding of what constitutes a eulogy. This misunderstanding, however, does not apply to the formal elements of the genre of epideictic oration. As you will note, his comments will conform to the conventional structure of encomia.
• He responds by making two substitutions. First, to address the second deficiency, he substitutes what he considers a eulogy, i.e., "selecting the most beautiful parts of the truth" "about anything that was to be given a eulogy" and organizing those parts "in the seemliest manner possible," for what he suggests is the other symposiasts' understanding of an encomium, a speech in praise, of Eros: to "assert that he is of this sort and that sort and the cause of so many things, so that he may seem to be as beautiful and good as possible—plainly to those who do not know, for this surely is not the case for those who do know—and so the praise turns out to be beautiful and awesome." Second, to compensate for his first inadequacy, he will refer to the perspectives of Diotima, his teacher. Through these substitutions, he asserts that the other symposiasts are not telling the truth (or, rather, that they do not know what the truth is), and he changes the format of the presentations from oratorical demonstrations to dialogic refutations.
• These two dialogues lead to ἀπορία (aporía), "a state of perplexity." How can the symposium continue as planned once Socrates has argued that the symposiasts are mistaken about what Eros is, he has changed the format from series of epideictic orations to dialogues, and he has introduced the views of Diotima, who is not present and therefore not subject to ἔλεγχος (élenchus), "refutation by cross-examination"?
Returning to the topic of leadership, this module follows the definition of leaders that Howard Gardner and Emma Laskin develop in Leading Minds: An Anatomy of Leadership (New York: Basic Books, 2011): leaders are "persons who, by word and/or personal example, markedly influence the behaviors, thoughts, and/or feelings of a significant number of their fellow human beings." One way of gaining influence, i.e., changing the way people think and act, is to alter the terms of engagement at points when contrasting or conflicting ideas or courses of action meet. At what points during his engagement with Agathon, and in the dialogue Socrates recounts with Diotima, do Socrates and Diotima alter the terms or focus of the debate, and how do they do it?
[198a] Aristodemus said that when Agathon had finished speaking, all those present applauded vigorously, as the youth had spoken in a way as suited to himself as to the god. Socrates then said, with a glance at Eryximachus, "Son of Akoumenos," he said, "is it your opinion that my long-standing fear was groundless, and that I was not prophetic, when I said before that Agathon would speak in a marvelous way, and that I should be at a loss?”
"In my opinion," Eryximachus said, "your first point was indeed prophetic, that Agathon would speak well; but as to the other, that you would be at a loss, that I do not believe.”
[198b] “You blessed innocent! How can you say that?" Socrates said. "Am I and anyone else whatsoever not to be at a loss after so fair and varied a speech has been made? Though the rest was not quite so marvelous, that bit at the end—who would not be thunderstruck on hearing the beauty of its words and phrases? I for my part, on reflecting that I myself should be unable to say anything nearly as beautiful, almost ran off and was gone in shame [198c] —if I had any place to go. For the speech reminded me of Gorgias; so I was simply affected as in the saying of Homer's. I was afraid that Agathon in his speech would at last send the head of the dread speaker Gorgias against my speeches and turn me to very stone in speechlessness. And then I realized that, after all, I am to be laughed at for having agreed to eulogize Eros in turn with [198d] you, and for claiming that I was skilled in erotics; for as it has turned out, I know nothing of the matter, nor how one is to eulogize anything. For in my stupidity I believed the truth had to be told about anything that was given a eulogy, and that this was the underpinning, and that by selecting the most beautiful parts of the truth one was to arrange them in the seemliest manner possible. And I was quite filled with the proud thought that I should speak well, since I knew the truth about praising anything. But it was not this after all, it seems, that was meant by the fair praising of anything, but the [198e] attribution to the matter at hand of the greatest and fairest things possible regardless of whether this was so or not. And if the praise were false, it was of no importance anyway; for the injunction was, it seems, that each of us should be thought to eulogize Eros, and not just eulogize him. It is for this reason, I suspect, that you leave no argument unturned and dedicate each and every argument to Eros. And you assert that he is of this sort and that sort and the cause of so many things, so that [199a] he may seem to be as beautiful and good as possible—plainly to those who do not know, for this surely is not the case for those who do know—and so the praise turns out to be beautiful and awesome. But after all I did not know that this was to be the manner of praise, and in ignorance I came to an agreement with you that I would take my turn in praising. 'So the tongue promised but the mind did not'; let me then call it quits. I am not a eulogist in this fashion: I am simply incapable of it. Not that I am unwilling—on the contrary I am willing [199b]—if you want, to tell the truth on my own terms, so long as my words are not to be compared with your speeches, lest I be laughed at. Decide, then, Phaedrus, if you have any need for such a speech too, for hearing the truth being said about Eros, even though the phrasing and arrangement of the sentences just fall as they come.”
He said that Phaedrus and the others urged Socrates to speak in whatever way he himself believed he had to speak.
"Allow me further, Phaedrus," he said, "to ask Agathon about a few small points, in order that when I have got him to agree with me I can go ahead and speak.”
[199c] “Well, I allow it," Phaedrus said. "Ask." After this he said that Socrates began from somewhat the following point.
"Well, dear Agathon, in my opinion you made a fine start to your speech, in saying that one had to show first what sort of being Eros himself is, and then his deeds. I very much admire this beginning. So come now, since you have explained fairly and magnificently all the rest about what sort he is, then [199d] tell me this as well about Eros: is Eros the sort that is love of something or of nothing? I am not asking whether he is of a mother or of a father (for the question whether Eros is love of mother or father would be laughable), but just as if I asked about this very word, father--is the father father of someone or not? You should doubtless tell me, if you wanted to give a fair reply, that the father is father of a son or daughter. Isn't that so?”
"Of course," Agathon said.
"And the same is true of the mother?" This too was agreed upon.
[199e] “Answer me just a little more," Socrates said, "so that you might come to understand better what I want. Suppose I asked, 'What about this point? Is a brother, just in terms of what he is, a brother of someone, or isn't he?’ "He answered that he is.
"And of a brother or a sister, right?" He agreed.
"Do try, then," he said, "to tell about love as well. Is Eros love of nothing or something?”
"Of course he is of something.”
[200a] “Keep this fast in your memory, this something of which you claim he is," Socrates said, "but now say only this much: That Eros that is the love of something, does he desire this something or not?”
"Of course he does," he said.
it?”
"It is at least likely that he does not have it," he said.
"Think," Socrates said, "is it not a necessity rather than a likelihood that the desirous thing desires what it is in need of, and does not [200b] desire unless it is in need? For in my opinion, Agathon, it is a marvelous necessity. What is your opinion?”
"It's my opinion too," he said.
“What you say is fair. Would anyone want to be tall if he were tall, or strong if he were strong?”
"From what has been agreed upon, that would be impossible.”
"For he surely would not be in need of those things that he already is.”
"What you say is true.”
"So that if he wanted to be strong being strong," Socrates said, "and swift being swift, and healthy being healthy—I say this so that we may not deceive ourselves, for one might perhaps suppose with regard to these and all cases of this sort that those who are [200c] of this sort and have these things desire those things that they have—but if you have these cases in mind, Agathon, then who would desire each of those things that of necessity he has at the moment when, whether he wants to or not, he has it? For whenever anyone says, 'I am healthy and want to be healthy or I am wealthy and want to be wealthy, and I desire those very things that I have,' we should tell him, 'You, human being, [200d] possessing wealth, health, and strength, want to possess them also in the future, since at the present moment at least, whether you want to or not, you have them. Consider then, whenever you say, "I want the present things," if you mean anything else than, "I want the things of the present moment to be present also in future time." Would he agree to that?” Aristodemus said that Agathon consented.
Socrates then said, "To want that those things be safe and present for him in future time, is to love that which is not yet at hand for him and which he does not have.”
[200e] “Of course," he said.
"So he and everyone else who desires what is not at hand desires what is not present; and what he does not have and what he himself is not and what he is in need of—it is things like that of which desire and love are, right?”
"Of course," he said. "Come then," Socrates said. "Let us draw up an agreement about what has been said. Eros is love, first of all, of some things, and secondly, of whatever things the need for which is present to him.”
[201a] “Yes,” he said.
"Would you now think back then to what you asserted Eros to be of in your speech; but if you want, I shall remind you. I believe you spoke somewhat along these lines-—that matters were arranged by the gods through love of beautiful things, for there would not be love of ugly things. Weren't you speaking somewhat along these lines?”
"I said so," Agathon said.
"And what you say is reasonable, comrade," Socrates said. "And if this is so, Eros would be nothing else than love of beauty, but not of ugliness?" He agreed.
[201b] “Hasn’t it been agreed that that of which one is in need and does not have one loves?”
"Yes," he said.
"So Eros is in need of and does not have beauty.”
"Of necessity," he said.
"What about this? That which is in need of beauty and in no way possesses beauty, do you say that it is beautiful?”
"Certainly not.”
"Do you still agree then that Eros is beautiful, if this is so?”
And Agathon said, "It's probable, Socrates, that I knew nothing of what I had said."
[201c] “And yet spoke you beautifully, Agathon," he said. "But, still, tell me about a small point. Are the good things beautiful as well in your opinion?”
"Yes, in mine.”
"So if Eros is in need of beautiful things, and the good things are fair, he would be in need of the good things as well.”
"I, Socrates," he said, "would not be able to contradict you; so let it be as you say.”
"Not at all, my dear Agathon. It is rather that you are unable to contradict the truth," he said, "since it is not at all hard to contradict Socrates.
[201d] “And I shall let you go for now, and turn to the speech about Eros that I once heard from a woman, Diotima of Mantineia. She was wise in these and many other things; when the Athenians once made a sacrifice before the plague, she caused the onset of the disease to be delayed ten years; and she is the very one who taught me erotics. The speech that she was wont to make, I shall now try to tell you all on the basis of what has been agreed on between Agathon and myself; and I shall try to do it on my own, as best I can. For just as you explained, Agathon, one must first [201e] tell who Eros himself is and what sort he is, and then tell his deeds. In my opinion, it is easiest to do this in just the same way that the stranger once did in quizzing me. For I came pretty near, in speaking to her, to saying the same sort of things that Agathon said to me now—that Eros was a great god, and was the love of beautiful things. She then went on to refute me with those same arguments with which I refuted him—that he is neither beautiful, according to my argument, nor good.
"And I said, 'How do you mean it, Diotima? Is Eros after all ugly and bad?’
"And she said, 'Hush! Or do you believe that whatever is not beautiful must necessarily be ugly?’
[202a] “‘Absolutely.’
"'And whatever is not wise, without understanding? Or were you unaware that there is something in between wisdom and lack of understanding?’
"'What is this?’
"'Don't you know,' she said, 'that to opine correctly without being able to give an account [logos] is neither to know expertly (for how could expert knowledge be an unaccounted for [alogon] matter?) nor lack of understanding (for how could lack of understanding be that which has hit upon what is)? But surely correct opinion is like that, somewhere between intelligence and lack of understanding.’
"'What you say is true,' I said.
[202b] “‘Then do not compel what is not beautiful to be ugly, or what is not good, to be bad. So too since you yourself agree that Eros is not good or beautiful, do not at all believe that he must be ugly and bad,' she said, 'but something between the two of them.’
"'And yet,' I said, 'it is agreed on by all that he is a great god.’
"'Do you mean by all who do not know,' she said, 'or by those who know?’
"'No, by all together.’
"And she said with a laugh, 'And how, Socrates, [202c] could he be agreed to be a great god by those who deny even that he is a god?’
"'Who are these?' I said.
"'You are one,' she said, 'and I am one.’
"And I said, 'How can you say this?' I said.
"And she said, 'It's easy. Tell me, don't you assert that all gods are happy and beautiful? Or would you dare to deny that any one of the gods is beautiful and happy?’
"'By Zeus, I would not,' I said.
"'But don't you mean by the happy precisely those who possess the good things and the beautiful things?’
"'Of course.’
[202d] “‘And do you hold to the agreement that Eros out of need for the good and beautiful things desires those very things of which he is in need?’
"'Yes, I hold to it.’
"'How then could he who is without a share in the beautiful and good things be a god?’
"'In no way, it seems.’
"'Do you see then,' she said, 'that you too hold that Eros is not a god?’
"'What would Eros then be?' I said. 'A mortal?’
"'Hardly that.’
"'Well, what then?’
"'Just as before,' she said, 'between mortal and immortal.’
"'What is that, Diotima?’
"'A great daemon, Socrates, for everything daemonic is [202e] between god and mortal.’
"'With what kind of power?' I said.
"'Interpreting and ferrying to gods things from human beings and to human beings things from gods: the requests and sacrifices of human beings, the orders and exchanges-for-sacrifices of gods; for it is in the middle of both and fills up the interval so that the whole itself has been bound together by it. Through this proceeds all divination and the art of the priests who deal with sacrifices, initiatory rituals, [203a] incantations, and every kind of sooth- saying and magic. A god does not mingle with a human being; but through this occurs the whole intercourse and conversation of gods with human beings while they are awake and asleep. And he who is wise in things like this is a daemonic man; but he who is wise in anything else concerning either arts or handicrafts is vulgar and low. These daemons are many and of all kinds; and one of them is Eros.’
"'Who is his father?' I said, 'And who is his mother?’
[203b] “‘It is rather long,' she said, 'to explain; but I shall tell you all the same. When Aphrodite was born, all the other gods as well as Poros [Resource] the son of Metis [Intelligence] were at a feast; and when they had dined, Penia [Poverty] arrived to beg for something—as might be expected at a festivity—and she hung about near the door. Then Poros got drunk on nectar—for them was not yet wine—and, heavy of head, went into the garden of Zeus and slept. Then Penia, who because of her own lack of resources was plotting to have a child made out of Poros, reclined [203c] beside him and conceived Eros. It is for this reason that Eros has been the attendant and servant of Aphrodite, as he was conceived on her birthday; for he is by nature a lover in regard to the beautiful, and Aphrodite is beautiful. So because Eros is the son of Poros and Penia, his situation is in some such case as this. First of all, he is always poor; and he is far from being tender and beautiful, as the many believe, but is tough, [203d] squalid, shoeless, and homeless, always lying on the ground without a blanket or a bed, sleeping in doorways and along waysides in the open air; he has the nature of his mother, always dwelling with neediness. But in accordance with his father he plots to trap the beautiful and the good, and is courageous, stout, and keen, a skilled hunter, always weaving devices, desirous of practical wisdom and inventive, philosophizing through all his life, a skilled magician, druggist, sophist. And his nature is neither [203e] immortal nor mortal; but sometimes on the same day he flourishes and lives, whenever he has resources; and sometimes he dies, but gets to live again through the nature of his father. And as that which is supplied to him is always gradually flowing out, Eros is never either without resources nor wealthy, but is in between wisdom and lack of understanding. [204a] For here is the way it is: No one of the gods philosophizes and desires to become wise--for he is so nor if there is anyone else who is wise, does he philosophize. Nor, in turn, do those who lack understanding philosophize and desire to become wise; for it is precisely this that makes the lack of understanding so difficult—that if a man is not beautiful and good, nor intelligent, he has the opinion that that is sufficient for him. Consequently, he who does not believe that he is in need does not desire that which he does not believe he needs.’
"'Then who, Diotima, are the philosophizers,' I said, 'if they are neither the wise nor those who lack understanding?’
[204b] “‘By now it is perfectly plain even to a child,' she said, 'that they are those between them both, of whom Eros would be one. For wisdom is one of the most beautiful things, and Eros is love in regard to the beautiful; and so Eros is—necessarily—a philosopher; and as a philosopher he is between being wise and being without understanding. His manner of birth is responsible for this, for he is of a wise and resourceful father, and an unwise and resourceless mother. Now the nature of the daemon, dear Socrates, is this; but as for the one whom you believed to be [204c] Eros, it is not at all surprising that you had this impression. You believed, in my opinion, as I conjecture from what you say, that the beloved is Eros, and is not that which loves. It is for this reason, I believe, that Eros seemed to you to be wholly beauti- ful. For the beloved thing is truly beautiful, delicate, perfect, and most blessed; but that which loves has another kind of look, the sort that I just explained.’
"And I said, 'All right, stranger, what you say is fine. If Eros is of this sort, of what use is he for human beings?’
[204d] “‘It is this, Socrates,' she said, 'that I shall next try to teach you. Now, Eros is of that sort and was born in that way; and he is of the beautiful things, as you assert. But what if someone were to ask us, "What about those beautiful' things of which Eros is, Socrates and Diotima?" It is more clearly expressed as follows: He who loves the beautiful things loves—what does he love?’
"And I said, 'That they be his.’
"'But the answer,' she said, 'still longs for the following sort of question: What will he have who gets the beautiful things?’
"I said that I was hardly capable of giving a ready answer to this question.
[204e] “‘Well,' she said. 'What if someone changed his query and used the good instead of the beautiful? Come, Socrates, the lover of the good things loves: what does he love?’
"'That they be his,' I said.
"'And what will he who gets the good things have?’
"'This,' I said, 'I can answer more adequately: he will be happy.’
[205a] “‘That,' she said, 'is because the happy are happy by the acquisition of good things; and there is no further need to ask, "For what consequence does he who wants to be happy want to be so?" But the answer is thought to be a complete one.’
"'What you say is true,' I said.
"'This wanting and this eros, do you suppose they are common to all human beings, and all want the good things to be theirs always, or how do you mean it?’
"'That way,' I said. 'They are common to all.’
"'Why is it, then, Socrates,' she said, 'that we deny that everyone loves— [205b] given, that is, that everyone loves the same things and always—but we say that some love and some do not?’
"'I too,' I said, 'am amazed.’
"'Well,' she said, 'don't persist in your amazement; for we detach from eros a certain kind of eros and give it the name eros, imposing upon it the name of the whole; while in the other cases we employ several different names.’
"'What are those?' I said.
"'Like the following: You know that "making" has a wide range; for, you see, every kind of making is responsible for anything whatsoever that is on the way from what is not to [205c] what is. And thus all the productions that are dependent on the arts are makings, and all the craftsmen engaged in them are makers.’
"'What you say is true.' "'But nevertheless,' she said, 'you know that not all craftsmen are called makers but have other names', and one part is separated off from all of making—that which is concerned with music and meters—and is addressed by the name of the whole. For this alone is called poetry; and those who have this part of making are poets.’
"'What you say is true,' I said.
[205d] “‘So too in the case of eros. In brief, eros is the whole desire of good things and of being happy, "the greatest and all-beguiling eros." But those who turn toward it in many other ways, in terms of either money-making, love of gymnastics, or philosophy, are neither said to love nor called lovers; whereas those who earnestly apply themselves to a certain single kind, get the name of the whole, love, and are said to love and called lovers.’
"'What you say is probably true,' I said.
"'And there is a certain account,' she said, 'according to which those who seek their [205e] own halves are lovers. But my speech denies that eros is of a half or of a whole--unless, comrade, that half or whole can be presumed to be really good; for human beings are willing to have their own feet and hands cut off, if their opinion is that their own are no good. For I suspect that each does not cleave to his own (unless one calls the good one's own and belonging to oneself, and the bad alien to oneself) since there is nothing that human beings [206a] love other than the good. Or is it your opinion that they do?’
"'No, by Zeus,' I said, 'that is not my opinion.’
"'Then,' she said, 'is it to be said unqualifiedly that human beings love the good?’
"'Yes,' I said.
"'What about this? Mustn't it be added,' she said, 'that they love the good to be theirs?’
"'It must be added.’
"'And not only that it be theirs,' she said, 'but always as well?’
"'This too must be added.’
"'So, in sum,' she said, 'eros is of the good's being one's own always.’
"'What you say is most true,' I said.
[206b] “‘Since eros is always this,' she said, 'then in what manner and in what activity would the earnestness and intensity of those who pursue the good be called eros. What in fact are they doing when they act so? Can you tell?’
"'If I could, Diotima, then I should not, you know, in admiration of your wisdom,' I said, 'resort to you to learn this very thing.’
"'Well, I shall tell you,' she said. 'Their deed is bringing to birth in beauty both in terms of the body and in terms of the soul.’
"'Whatever it is that you mean,' I said, 'is in need of divination, and I do not begin to understand.’
[206c] “‘Well, I shall speak more clearly,' she said. 'All human beings, Socrates,' she said, 'conceive both in terms of the body and in terms of the soul, and whenever they are at a certain age, their nature desires to give birth; but it is incapable of giving birth in ugliness, but only in beauty, for the being together of man and woman is a bringing to birth. This thing, pregnancy and bringing to birth, is divine, and it is immortal in the animal that is mortal. It is impossible for this to happen in the unfitting; and [206d] the ugly is unfitting with everything divine, but the beautiful is fitting. So Kallone [Beauty] is the Moira [Fate] and Eileithyia for birth. It is for these reasons that whenever the pregnant draws near to beauty, it becomes glad and in its rejoicing dissolves and then gives birth and produces offspring; but whenever it draws near to ugliness, then, downcast and in pain, it contracts inwardly, turns away, shrinks up, and does not produce offspring, but checking the course of the pregnancy, has a hard time of it. So this is why someone who is pregnant, with breasts already swelling, flutters so much [206e] around the beautiful, because the one who has the beautiful releases him from great labor pains. For eros is not, Socrates,' she said, 'of the beautiful, as you believe.’
"'Well, what then?’
"'It is of engendering and bringing to birth in the beautiful.’
"'All right,' I said.
"'It is more than all right,' she said. 'And why is eros of engendering? Because engendering is born forever and is immortal as far as that can happen to a mortal being. From what has been agreed to, [207a] it is necessary to desire immortality with good, provided eros is of the good's always being one's own. So it is necessary from this argument that eros be of immortality too.’
"All of these things she used to teach me whenever she made her speeches about erotics. And once she also asked, 'What do you believe, Socrates, is the cause of this eros and desire? Or aren't you aware how uncanny is the disposition of all the beasts (the footed as well as the winged) whenever they desire to produce offspring? They are all ill [207b] and of an erotic disposition, first concerning actual intercourse with one another, then later concerning the nurture of what is generated. And they are ready to fight to the finish, the weakest against the strongest, for the sake of those they have generated, and to die on their behalf; and they are willingly racked by starvation and stop at nothing to nourish their offspring. One might suppose,' she said, 'that human beings do this from calculation; but as for the beasts, what is the cause of their erotic [207c] disposition’s being of this sort? Can you say?’
"And I again said that I did not know; and she said, 'Do you really. think you will ever become skilled in erotics, if you do not understand this?’
"'But you see, Diotima, that is the reason--as I said just now--why I have come to you: I know I am in need of teachers. But do tell me the cause of these things as well as of the rest that concern erotics.’
"'If you put your trust,' she said, 'in the statement that by nature eros is of that which we have often agreed to, don't persist in your amazement. For in [207d] the eros of the beasts, in terms of the same argument as that concerning men, the mortal nature seeks as far as possible to be forever and immortal. Mortal nature is capable of immortality only in this way, the way of generation, because it is always leaving behind another that is young to replace the old. For while each one of the animals is said to live and be the same (for example, one is spoken of as the same from the time one is a child until one is an old man; and though he never has the same things in himself, nevertheless, he is called the same), he is forever becoming young in some respects as he suffers losses in other respects: his hair, flesh, bones, [207e] blood, and his whole body. And this is so not only in terms of the body but also in terms of the soul; his ways, character, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, fears, each of these things is never present as the same for each, but they are partly coming to be and partly perishing. And what is far stranger still is that in the case of our sciences [208a] too not only are some coming to be while others are perishing (and we are never the same in terms of the sciences either); but also each single one of the sciences is affected in the same way. For studying, as it is called, is done on the grounds that the science is passing out from us; for forgetfulness is the exiting of science; and studying, by instilling a fresh memory again to replace the departing one, preserves the science, so that it may be thought to be the same. For in this way every mortal thing is preserved; not by being absolutely the same forever, as the [208b] divine is, but by the fact that that which is departing and growing old leaves behind another young thing that is as it was. By this device, Socrates,' she said, 'the mortal shares in immortality, both body and all the rest; but the immortal has a different way. So do not be amazed if everything honors by nature its own offshoot; for it is for the sake of immortality that this zeal and eros attend everything.’
"And when I had heard her speech I was amazed and said, 'Really!' I said. 'Wisest Diotima, is it truly like this?’
[208c] “And she, like the perfect Sophists, said, 'Know it well, Socrates,' she said, 'inasmuch as in the case of human beings, if you were willing to glance at their love of honor, you would be amazed at their irrationality unless you understand what I have said and reflect how uncanny their disposition is made by their love of renown, "and their setting up immortal fame for eternity"; and for the sake of fame even more than for their [208d] children, they are ready to run all risks, to exhaust their money, to toil at every sort of toil, and to die. For do you suppose,' she said, 'that Alcestis would have died for Admetus' sake, or Achilles would have died after Patroclus, or your own Codrus would have died before his sons for the sake of their kingship, if they had not believed that there would be an immortal remembering of their virtue, which we now retain? Far from it,' she said, 'but I believe that all do all things for the sake of immortal virtue and a famous reputation of that sort; and the better [208e] they are, so much the more is it thus; for they love the immortal. Now there are those who are pregnant in terms of their bodies,' she said, 'and they turn rather to women and are erotic in this way, furnishing for themselves through the procreation of children immortality, remembrance, and happiness (as they believe) for all future time. But there are others who are pregnant in terms of the [209a] soul—for these, in fact,' she said, 'are those who in their souls even more than in their bodies conceive those things that it is appropriate for soul to conceive and bear. And what is appropriate for soul? Prudence and the rest of virtue; it is of these things that all the poets and all the craftsmen who are said to be inventive are procreators; and by far the greatest and most beautiful part of prudence,' she said, 'is the arranging and ordering of the affairs of cities and households. Its name is moderation and justice. So whenever someone from [209b] youth onward is pregnant in his soul with these virtues, if he is divine and of suitable age, then he desires to give birth and produce offspring. And he goes round in search, I believe, of the beautiful in which he might generate; for he will never generate in the ugly. So it is beautiful bodies rather than ugly ones to which he cleaves because he is pregnant; and if he meets a beautiful, generous, and naturally gifted soul, he cleaves strongly to the two (body and soul) together. And to this human being he is at once fluent in speeches about virtue—of what sort the good man [209c] must be and what he must practice—and he tries to educate him. So in touching the one who is beautiful, I suspect, and in association with him, he engenders and gives birth to offspring with which he was long pregnant; and whether the [lover] is present or absent he holds the beautiful one in memory, and nurtures with him that which has been generated in common. Therefore, those of this sort maintain a greater association and firmer friendship with one another than do those who have children in common, because the children they share in common are more beautiful and more immortal. And everyone would choose to have for himself children like these rather than the [209d] human kind; and if one looks at Homer, Hesiod, and the other good poets, one envies them: what offspring of themselves they have left behind! For as these offspring are in their own right immortal, they supply the poets with immortal fame and memory. And if you want,' she said, 'think of the children that Lycurgus left behind in Sparta, the preservers of Sparta and, to exaggerate a little, of Greece. Solon too is honored among you through his engendering of the laws; and other men [209e] as well in many other regions, among Greeks and among barbarians, by their showing forth of many beautiful deeds, have engendered every kind of virtue. It is to these that many sanctuaries are now dedicated through children of this kind; while through the human sort there are no sanctuaries for anyone yet.
"'Now perhaps, Socrates, you too might be [210a] initiated into these erotics; but as for the perfect revelations—for which the others are means, if one were to proceed correctly on the way—I do not know if you would be able to be initiated into them. Now I shall speak,' she said. 'I shall not falter in my zeal: do try to follow, if you are able. He who is to move correctly in this matter must begin while young to go to beautiful bodies. And first of all, if the guide is guiding correctly, he must love one body and there generate beautiful speeches. Then he must realize that the beauty [210b] that is in any body whatsoever is related to that in another body; and if he must pursue the beauty of looks, it is great folly not to believe that the beauty of all bodies is one and the same. And with this realization he must be the lover of all beautiful bodies and in contempt slacken this [erotic] intensity for only one body, in the belief that it is petty. After this he must believe that the beauty in souls is more honorable than that in the body. So that even if someone who is decent in his soul has only a slight youthful charm [210c], the lover must be content with it, and love and cherish him, and engender and seek such speeches as will make the young better; in order that [the lover], on his part, may be compelled. to behold the beautiful in pursuits and laws, and to see that all this is akin to itself, so that he may come to believe that the beauty of the body is something trivial. And after these pursuits, he must lead [the beloved] on to the sciences, so that he [himself, the lover] may see the beauty of sciences, and in looking at the beautiful, which is now so [210d] vast, no longer be content like a lackey with the beauty in one, of a boy, of some human being, or of one practice, nor be a sorry sort of slave and petty calculator; but with a permanent turn to the vast open sea of the beautiful, behold it and give birth—in ungrudging philosophy—to many beautiful and magnificent speeches and thoughts; until, there strengthened and increased, he may discern a certain single philosophical science, which has as its object the following [210e] sort of beauty. Try to pay as close attention as you can,' she said. 'Whoever has been educated up to this point in erotics, beholding successively and correctly the beautiful things, in now going to the perfect end of erotics shall suddenly glimpse something wonderfully beautiful in its nature—that very thing, Socrates, for whose sake alone all the prior labors were undertaken—something that is, first of all [211a], always being and neither coming to be nor perishing, nor increasing nor passing away; and secondly, not beautiful in one respect and ugly in another, nor at one time so, and at another time not—either with respect to the beautiful or the ugly or here beautiful and there ugly, as being beautiful to some and ugly to others; nor in turn will the beautiful be imagined by him as a kind of face or hands or anything else in which body shares, nor as any speech nor any science, and not as being somewhere in something else (for example, in an animal, or in earth, or in heaven [211b], or in anything else), but as it is alone by itself and with itself, always being of a single form; while all other beautiful things that share in it do so in such a way that while it neither becomes anything more or less, nor is affected at all, the rest do come to be and perish. So whenever anyone begins to glimpse that beauty as he goes on up from these things through the correct practice of pederasty, he must come close to touching the perfect end. For this is what it is to proceed correctly [211c], or to be led by another, to erotics—beginning from these beautiful things here, always to proceed on up for the sake of that beauty, using these beautiful things here as steps: from one to two, and from two to all beautiful bodies; and from beautiful bodies to beautiful pursuits; and from pursuits to beautiful lessons; and from lessons to end at that lesson, which is the lesson of nothing else than the beautiful itself; and at last to know what is [211d] beauty itself. It is at this place in life, in beholding the beautiful itself, my dear Socrates,' the Mantinean stranger said, 'that it is worth living, if—for a human being—it is [worth living] at any place. Should you ever see the beautiful itself, it will be your opinion that it is not to be compared to gold and garments and the beautiful boys and youths at whose sight you are now thunderstruck. And you and many others are prepared, in seeing the beloved and in always being with him, neither to eat nor drink, if it were somehow possible, but only to behold him and be with him. What then,' she said, 'do we believe happens to one, if he gets [211e] to see the beautiful itself, pure, clean, unmixed, and not infected with human flesh, colors, or a lot of other mortal foolishness, and can glimpse the divine beautiful itself as being of a single shape? Do you believe,' she said, 'that life would prove to be a sorry [212a] sort of thing, when a human being gazes in the direction of the beautiful and beholds it with the instrument with which he must and is together with it? Or don't you realize,' she said, 'that only here, in seeing in the way the beautiful is seeable, will he get to engender not phantom images of virtue—because he does not lay hold of a phantom—but true, because he lays hold of the true; and that once he has given birth to and cherished true virtue,. it lies within him to become dear to god and, if it is possible for any human being, to become immortal as well?’
[212b] “Here, Phaedrus and you others, is what Diotima declared and what I am convinced of. And in this state of conviction, I try to persuade others that for this possession one could not easily get a better co-worker with human nature than Eros. Accordingly, I assert that every real man must honor Eros, as I myself honor erotics and train myself exceptionally in them; and I urge it on the rest, and now and always I eulogize the power and courage of Eros as far as I am able. Regard this [212c] speech, then, Phaedrus, if you want to, as spoken in eulogy of Eros; but if not, and your pleasure is to give it some other kind of name, so name it." When Socrates had said this, some praised it; and Aristophanes tried to say something, because Socrates in speaking had mentioned him and referred to his speech.