Introduction

From the dark days of Stalinist terror to the current oppression under Vladimir Putin, political humor has served as a vital outlet for dissent and social critique in Russia. Satirical anecdotes provided a means for Soviet citizens to subtly mock their rulers and puncture the fear and mythmaking propping up the regime (Brandenberger, 2009). Today, satirical memes and online comments allow Russians to anonymously express discontent with Putinism and its many absurdities and injustices (Shomova, 2022). 

While the forms and mediums of political humor have evolved, its essential function as a "weapon of the weak" (Scott, 1985) has remained constant. In a society where opposition is harshly punished, jokes offer a relatively safe way to highlight the flaws and contradictions of those in power. They foster a sense of solidarity and resistance among the disempowered. Yet the risks for satirists in Russia have grown significantly under Putin's rule (Semenenko, 2021). Shows like the legendary 1990s puppet satire Kukly, which ruthlessly criticized Boris Yeltsin and the early Putin, would be unthinkable on Russian TV today. The few satirists who still dare to subtly mock the regime, like stand-up comic Kostya Pushkin, must navigate a minefield of unspoken red lines and employ Aesopian language to convey their true meanings without drawing the government's attention (Pushkin, 2024). 

This paper will look at the evolution of political humor in Russia from the Soviet era to the present day, focusing on how satirists and ordinary citizens have found creative ways to express dissent in the face of increasing authoritarianism. Using the theoretical frameworks of Bakhtin, Oushakine, Scott, and others, I will analyze Russian satire's shifting forms and coded language as different mediums - from Soviet-era anecdotes to TV shows like Kukly to contemporary YouTube comments and online memes. I argue that while the Putin regime has steadily tightened its grip on public discourse, political humor has survived as a "weapon of the weak," with new genres like internet memes offering a diffuse, anonymized way for Russians to mock their rulers and commiserate about the daily absurdities of life under Putinism. Even as the risks grow, the rebellious spirit of satire endures.

Theoretical Framework: Humor, Satire, and Dissent

To understand the role of political humor as a form of dissent, it is crucial to draw on theoretical perspectives that highlight the subversive and liberating potential of laughter. Mikhail Bakhtin's work on the carnivalesque is foundational in this regard. In his seminal text Rabelais and His World, Bakhtin argues that the carnivalesque spirit of medieval folk humor served to temporarily overturn official hierarchies and dogmas, creating a space of freedom and renewal (Bakhtin, 1984). 

Central to Bakhtin's conception is the idea that laughter has the power to "uncrown" authority figures and reveal the contingency and absurdity of the social order. By inverting hierarchies and bringing the high low and the low high, carnivalesque humor subverts the notion of a fixed, eternal truth. Bakhtin writes that

“laughter has the remarkable power of making an object come up close, of drawing it into a zone of crude contact where one can finger it familiarly on all sides, turn it upside down, inside out...take it apart, dismember it" (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 23).

This quote suggests that the seemingly untouchable can be mocked and destabilized through laughter, stripping it of its aura of immutability.
Scott's Weapons of the Weak (Scott, 1985) further explains how subtle forms of resistance, such as humor, can be wielded by those without overt power to challenge oppressive structures. He emphasizes the everyday forms of resistance that might not overtly challenge authority but create a shared sense of subversion among the oppressed. This aligns with Bakhtin’s notion of humor as a form of liberation from normative pressures.

In authoritarian societies where dissent is circumscribed, parody and satire can serve as crucial vehicles for conveying subversive messages and asserting agency against overwhelming state power. Oushakine explores how post-Soviet Russian humor serves as a coping mechanism and a subtle form of political commentary (Oushakine, 2012). His analysis resonates with Bakhtin's notion that carnivalesque humor, while initially celebratory, can evolve into subdued, internalized forms of resistance that mirror real-life conditions. Specifically, Bakhtin suggests that in certain novels, this once-exuberant, satirical spirit becomes muted and manifests itself through characters whose existence embodies the very oppression and hardship that the carnival initially mocked and subverted (Bakhtin, 1984).

Despite the potent cultural role of satirical humor illuminated by the theoretical perspectives of Bakhtin, Scott, and Oushakine, it is crucial not to overstate its capacity to fundamentally challenge authoritarianism. While political satire provides a vital outlet for dissent, fostering solidarity and affirming human dignity against oppressive regimes, its power to catalyze tangible political change remains limited. Regimes like Putin's have grown adept at monitoring and co-opting the online spaces where much modern satire proliferates, blurring the lines between genuine subversion and orchestrated consent (Semenenko, 2021). 

Soviet Era Political Humor 

During the Soviet era, political humor emerged as a vital form of covert protest against the state's oppressive totalitarian regime (Brandenberger, 2009). Soviet citizens wielded jokes and anecdotes as tools to subtly mock and undermine the regime's authority. These anecdotes often targeted the cult of personality surrounding Stalin and highlighted the absurdities and contradictions inherent in Soviet life. 

For instance, a widely circulated anecdote humorously depicted a man's response when asked about his opinion on the Soviet government: "It's the same as my feelings towards my wife: I don't love her, but I tolerate her." Another joke mocked the Soviet electoral system by showing Stalin as the sole candidate, yet still securing only 99.9% of the vote, with a single defiant grandmother casting a vote against him. Through the use of irony and absurdity, such anecdote safely articulated the unspoken realities of the cruelties and dysfunctions of Stalinism.

These subversive expressions resonate with Mikhail Bakhtin's concept of the liberating power of carnival laughter and his view that humor can challenge dominant power structures and ideologies (Bakhtn, 1984). By inverting hierarchies and subverting notions of fixed, eternal truths, the anecdotes of the Soviet era exemplified Bakhtin's ideas. In addition to anecdotes, satirical literature and publications also served as outlets for dissent and social commentary during this period.

Mikhail Zoshchenko, one of the most prominent Soviet satirists, initially gained approval from Communist authorities by satirizing the average Soviet citizen's ignorance and self-interest (Domar, 1953). However, his early works, such as "Chortova Igrushechka" ("The Devil's Little Plaything"), subtly criticized the Marxist ideology applied to Russian conditions by portraying the revolution as a foreign-made "plaything" that was incongruous with Russian reality (Posin, 1950). Zoshchenko's later works continued to use humor to expose the absurdities of Soviet life, eventually leading to his censure for portraying an unflattering picture of Soviet reality (Domar, 1953). 

One particularly poignant example of Zoshchenko's satire is his short story "Galosh," where the loss of a single galosh leads to a frustrating and comically exaggerated odyssey through the Soviet bureaucracy (Zoshchenko, 2000). This story encapsulates the daily absurdities faced by Soviet citizens, where a trivial problem requires navigating a labyrinth of inefficient, often nonsensical bureaucratic procedures. The story's humor and irony highlight the disconnect between the trivial nature of the problem and the complex system ostensibly designed to solve it, effectively critiquing the disproportionate and cumbersome bureaucratic machine.

Similarly, Krokodil, a popular satirical magazine, utilized graphic satire to comment on political and social issues within the Soviet Union (Pehowski, 1978). The magazine's content, which included caricatures of capitalist archetypes and critiques of technological inefficiencies, bureaucratic ineptitude, and social problems, showcased the complexity and diversity of Soviet satire. Krokodil's humor was not merely a tool of state propaganda but also a medium for critiquing the Soviet system itself.

Zoshchenko's works and Krokodil's cartoons demonstrate Bakhtin's concept of "carnivalesque" humor, subverting official discourse and creating a space for alternative voices. By employing techniques such as irony, parody, and hyperbolic stylization, these satirical works exposed the absurdities of the Soviet system, revealing the tension between official ideology and everyday reality.

In conclusion, the Soviet era's political humor manifested through satirical literature, anecdotes, and stories like "Galosh" served as a crucial means of dissent and social commentary. It highlighted the discrepancies between the official narratives propagated by the regime and the lived experiences of Soviet citizens, offering a nuanced and subversive understanding of the complexities of life under the totalitarian system. This tradition of using humor as a form of subtle dissent has persisted and evolved in new forms under Putin's authoritarian regime.

Post-Soviet "Golden Age" of Satire

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the dawn of a brief "golden age" for Russian satire (Belin, 2002). Satirists like Mikhail Zadornov, who had gained popularity in the late Soviet period for his wry commentary on bureaucracy and consumer shortages, found new creative freedom in the chaotic transition to post-Soviet Russia (Rulyova, 2010). Zadornov adapted his comedic perspective to satirize the upheaval, economic turmoil and dashed expectations of the Yeltsin era (Gordon, 2010). His ability to remain resonant and relatable during this period of immense social change exemplified satire's enduring role in giving voice to the people's frustrations during political upheaval. 

The newfound openness and tumult of the 1990s paved the way for an unprecedented level of biting, uninhibited mockery directed at political leaders and the privileged elite (Belin, 2002). Among the most iconic and influential satirical shows was Kukly, a puppet-based program that aired from 1994 to 2002 (Brassard, 2022). Drawing inspiration from the British show Spitting Image, Kukly presented grotesque caricatures of Russian politicians, oligarchs, and cultural figures, skewering them in a series of scathing skits and musical parodies.

Kukly was unflinching in its satire, targeting figures across the political spectrum, but it reserved particular venom for President Boris Yeltsin and his successor, Vladimir Putin. Yeltsin was often portrayed as a clumsy, inebriated figure, prone to slurring his words and stumbling. In a particularly biting sketch, he was depicted dancing with the Grim Reaper, symbolizing both his deteriorating health and the nation's precarious state during his tenure. When Putin first appeared on the show in 2000, he was cast as a sinister, power-hungry ex-KGB agent, starkly contrasting his public persona as a stabilizing force.

The audacity of Kukly in directly mocking Russia's most powerful individuals was a refreshing change for a populace long accustomed to the repressive censorship of the Soviet era (Semenenko, 2021). The show captured the anarchic spirit of the Yeltsin years, characterized by oligarchic power struggles, economic chaos, and a general sense of upended norms and conventions. Through its incisive satire, Kukly gave voice to widespread disillusionment with the political elite and the tumultuous nature of the post-Soviet transition (Brassard, 2022). 

However, this era of unrestrained political humor was short-lived. Upon assuming power, Putin swiftly moved to clamp down on Kukly and other satirical outlets that dared to criticize him. In 2000, the authorities initiated a criminal investigation into the show for allegedly "insulting the president," leading to intense pressure and threats against its creator, Viktor Shenderovich. Although Kukly managed to remain on air for a few more years, by 2002, it had been canceled, along with most other satirical programs critical of Putin (Hutchings and Rulyova, 2009). 

This suppression of political humor was part of a larger effort by Putin to curtail independent media and solidify his control over the nation's information landscape (Tagangaeva, 2013). He marginalized dissenting oligarchs like Vladimir Gusinsky, the owner of Kukly's network NTV, and brought major television channels under the sway of the Kremlin. The days of mainstream satirical shows openly ridiculing the president on national television had come to an end (Brassard, 2022). In the face of Putin's tightening grip, political humor was forced to adapt, seeking refuge in more nuanced and covert forms.

The trajectory of Kukly encapsulates the evolution of post-Soviet Russian satire—from the exuberant freedom of expression in the 1990s due to the sobering clampdown under Putin's regime. The show demonstrated both the invigorating potential of satirical free speech and the vulnerability of such freedoms when confronted by a resurgent autocracy (Hutchings and Rulyova, 2009). Although a program like Kukly is inconceivable on Russian television today, its legacy endures in the subtler and more dispersed manifestations of political humor that have arisen online and in alternative venues under Putin's rule.

Political Humor Under Putin

In the two decades since Vladimir Putin came to power, the landscape for political satire in Russia has significantly contracted. The era when shows like Kukly could boldly ridicule the president and depict him as a malevolent autocrat has passed. Today, mainstream Russian television largely refrains from mocking Putin, treating him with a careful reverence. Even KVN, a long-standing sketch show known for its political satire, now portrays Putin as a wise and serious leader when he appears in the show (Semenenko, 2021).

This shift underscores the Putin regime's tightening control over the boundaries of acceptable speech and its efforts to shape public discourse to align with its narratives. From a Foucault perspective, this can be seen as an exercise of "disciplinary power," extending beyond mere censorship to influence the norms of what can and cannot be articulated (Foucault et al., 1991). By sanctioning only "approved" jokes that affirm Putin's authority and suppressing critical satirical content, the state delineates the boundaries of humor, creating a chilling effect as satirists internalize these implicit boundaries.

Despite these constraints, some comedians within Russia, such as Kostya Pushkin, find subtle ways to navigate the treacherous waters of political humor. In his stand-up special "Eto Vse Shutki" ("This is All Jokes"), Pushkin employs humor to comment on the absurdities and hypocrisies of life under Putin's rule (Puskin, 2024).. He jokes about the scarcity of choices in leisure activities, the restrictions on free speech, and the absurdity of navigating a heavily censored and controlled society. Pushkin's humor, while cautious, manages to critique the system of "managed democracy" that produces farcical elections and compliant parliaments.Other satirical shows, like the sketch comedy Nasha Russia (2006-2011), focused on mocking social issues, regional stereotypes, and the absurdities of everyday life for average Russians rather than directly targeting Putin or top political leadership (Semenenko, 2021).

Alexei Navalny effectively utilized online platforms, particularly YouTube, to launch satirical yet scathing attacks on the Kremlin's corruption and hypocrisy through his investigative journalism (Kazun, 2019). His videos, often including satirical commentary and ironic praise of government officials, have galvanized a significant following. Navalny cleverly used humor and satire to make complex issues accessible and engaging, enhancing the impact of his exposes on illegal wealth and corruption among Russia's elite.

The online realm continues to serve as a crucial outlet for more openly satirical content beyond the reach of the Kremlin's censors (Bodrunova, 2021). Social media platforms have become vital spaces for Russians to share memes and anecdotes that mock Putin (Semenenko, 2021), often depicting him as short, vain, corrupt, and aggressively macho. The ongoing war in Ukraine has also given rise to grim, gallows humor as both Russian and Ukrainian citizens use satire to cope with the toll of sanctions, militarization, and bloodshed (Browning and Brassett, 2023).

For instance, the Russian saying "deneg net, no vy derzhites" ("there's no money, but you hang in there") has evolved into a sarcastic meme, highlighting the government's indifference to citizens' economic struggles (Vladimirova, 2022). Ukrainians mock the Kremlin's outlandish propaganda claims, such as the assertion that the war is going so well that Russia will soon conquer Mars. These dark memes and anecdotes provide a means for individuals to find solace and maintain their sanity amid a barrage of official falsehoods and relentless militarism (Browning and Brassett, 2023).

Thus, while the space for political humor has undoubtedly shrunk under Putin's rule, it has not vanished entirely. Instead, it has transitioned to more nuanced, coded expressions and dispersed across online platforms (Brassard, 2022). However, the Russian government has enacted new laws since the start of the war in Ukraine that aim to stifle dissent and criticism even on social media, making the consequences of satirical humor even more severe (Troianovski et al., 2024). Despite the heightened risks, Russian satirists like Pushkin and everyday citizens continue to wield humor as a tool to combat fear and absurdity. In such a political climate marked by increasing repression and uncertainty, humor still remains an essential outlet and a mechanism for coping.
 

Online Spaces as "Weapons of the Weak"

In the authoritarian landscape of Putin's Russia, where open dissent is met with severe repercussions, online platforms have emerged as vital "weapons of the weak" (Scott, 1985) for citizens to voice their dissent and challenge the regime's dominant narratives. Despite the Kremlin's increasing control over the internet, spaces like YouTube and social media continue to offer a restricted yet significant avenue for Russians to engage in subversive political humor and commentary (Lerner and Novikova, 2024). 

The comment sections of YouTube videos featuring Soviet-era satirical shows like Kukly have transformed into impromptu forums where Russians reminisce about the relative freedom of the 1990s and critique the current authoritarian regime. Users employ the memorable punchlines from these shows as a form of coded language to indirectly comment on contemporary issues and leadership, lamenting the absence of such sharp satire in today's mainstream media. 

Similarly, internet memes have become a prominent tool for political satire and dissent (Shomova, 2022). Opposition activists circulate mocking depictions of Putin, highlighting his perceived shortcomings, while ordinary Russians use memes to underscore economic struggles, social injustices, and the dissonance between official propaganda and lived experiences. The government's dismissive "deneg net" ("there's no money") response to economic grievances (Vladimirova, 2022) and the misleading portrayal of the conflict in Ukraine are frequent targets of this online satire (Hernandez, 2023).

Navalny's online activism played a pivotal role in challenging Putin's authoritarian grip (Kazun, 2019) until his tragic death in 2024. Through hard-hitting investigative videos disseminated on social media and his immensely popular YouTube channel, he exposed shocking cases of high-level corruption implicating Putin's inner circle. His fearless whistleblowing sparked anti-regime protests across Russia, rallying a new generation yearning for democratic change. Even after being repeatedly jailed, Navalny defiantly marshaled his online following to keep the embers of dissent burning, undaunted by the Kremlin's escalating crackdown (Demydova, 2021). His untimely demise while imprisoned was a staggering blow, but his legacy as a digital-age democracy warrior lived on, inspiring continued civil resistance against Putin's repression through the channels Navalny pioneered. The regime eliminated one of its biggest critics but could not silence the clamor for reform he catalyzed online (Rainsford, 2024).

These digital expressions of humor serve as a contemporary counterpart to the anecdotes and kitchen jokes of the Soviet era. Just as those whispered jests allowed individuals to subtly express their dissent (Brandenberger, 2009), today's internet memes and comments enable Russians to covertly critique the regime and find solace in shared laughter. The anonymity and widespread nature of online platforms offer a layer of protection for these satirical expressions, although the risk of state retribution is not entirely eliminated.

The prevalence of this indirect humor underscores the Russian populace's acute awareness of the boundaries of permissible speech and the grave consequences of transgressing them. The fact that citizens resort to such veiled online humor rather than openly mocking their leaders highlights the repressive and arbitrary nature of the regime's control over public discourse (Ivanova et al., 2017). This online satire, tinged with gallows humor, serves as a means of coping with the oppressive reality imposed by the state.

However, it's important not to overestimate the political impact of online satire. While these "weapons of the weak" provide an outlet for expressing discontent, they operate within the confines set by the state, acting more as a safety valve than a catalyst for change(Scott, 1985). Sharing a sarcastic meme is not equivalent to active political protest, and the Kremlin has shown skill in monitoring and neutralizing oppositional online spaces (Lipman 2017).

Nonetheless, the persistence of subversive political humor on the Russian internet is a testament to the enduring desire of citizens to resist and mock their rulers, despite the formidable challenges they face. Confined to the margins and compelled to communicate in cryptic terms, the spirit of satire endures in Russia's online spaces, maintaining a flickering flame of dissent amidst the darkness of authoritarianism.

Conclusion 

Despite the potent cultural role of satirical humor illuminated by theoretical perspectives like Bakhtin's, one must avoid overstating its capacity to fundamentally challenge authoritarianism. While providing a vital outlet for dissent and affirming human dignity against oppressive regimes, political satire's power to catalyze tangible political change remains limited in tightly controlled contexts like contemporary Russia. Regimes like Putin's have grown adept at monitoring and co-opting the online spaces where much modern satire thrives, blurring the lines between genuine resistance and orchestrated consent.

Nonetheless, the persistent resolve of Russians to mock their leaders through evolving forms - from the clandestine jokes and anecdotes of the Soviet era to today's irreverent internet memes - speaks to an indomitable yearning for freedom of expression. Wielded as "weapons of the weak," these various incarnations of political humor illuminate the path toward a more liberated public discourse, offering flickering flames of resistance against authoritarianism's darkness. Through such subversive laughter, Russians articulate a utopian vision of a freer society worth striving for. This humor serves as a means for the oppressed to preserve and express an alternative societal ideal that counters the dominant narratives imposed upon them. 

Just as Soviet citizens once found release and solidarity in the irreverent anecdotes that satirized the absurdities of their repressive regime, so too do contemporary Russians turn to online memes and jokes to cope with and denounce the hypocrisies of Putinism. This continuum of satirical dissent highlights humor's enduring role as a means of coping with oppression while insisting on the possibility of a more equitable reality. Though humor alone may not topple dictatorships, it can prevent authoritarians from enjoying the unchallenged obedience of the masses - a modest yet profound form of resistance.

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