This page is referenced by:

• 1 media/hurricane-evacuation-tips_medium.png 2017-05-03T23:11:09-07:00 Evacuation Efforts 11 plain 2017-05-04T16:30:04-07:00 It is no secret that evacuations are both inconvenient and disruptive and so evacuees often delay travel decisions until the threat becomes imminent. This then compresses the massive travel demand into shorter time periods and therefore neglects the fact that transportation infrastructure is neither planned nor designed to accommodate evacuation-level demand. Building enough capacity to move the population of an entire city in a matter of hours is a feat that is simply not economically, environmentally, or socially feasible. Also, the effectiveness of an evacuation is greatly impacted human behavior and socioeconomics; no matter how threatening the conditions, some people refuse and are unable to leave. These are all factors that are not foreign to the response of Hurricane Katrina.
   
  Despite all these difficulties, it is argued that the evacuation of New Orleans for Hurricane Katrina was widely viewed as a success. Data indicates that more people were able to leave the city in a shorter time than be thought possible. What is however missing from such findings is the efficacy of the evacuation of low-mobility groups. In New Orleans, the goal was to get as many people as possible out of the threat zone by making full use of the available traffic lanes. The Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (LA DOTD) and the Louisiana State Police (LSP), who formed a Louisiana Evacuation Task Force identified four primary issues that hampered the evacuation: (1) over –reliance on westward traffic movement; (2) inefficient loading of the contraflow freeway segment out of New Orleans; (3) extreme congestion resulting from the confluence of multiple regional evacuation routes in Baton Rouge, Hammond, Lafayette, Covington, and Slidell; and, (4) the lack of real-time, accurate traffic information.   
   
  The biggest failure of the plans for evacuating the low-mobility population was undoubtedly lack of communication. It was widely known that approximately 112,000 people did not have access to personal vehicles at the time of storm. Public officials thus advocated for “neighbor helping neighbor,” but did little to make evacuation plans as apparent. These measures can only be effective if people were aware of them and heeded if released ahead of time. Therefore, future efforts must focus on controlling evacuation travel demand and this can be facilitated through better public information and education programs, which includes educating the public about which areas are at dire risk and working with news media to provide more accurate descriptions of these threat levels. In addition, evacuation plans be communicated throughout the year via public information campaigns, public service announcements, and tourist information centers.
   
  LA DOTD and LSP have been working toward communicating evacuation plans through news media outlets and public service announcements in an effort to urge people to prepare for future evacuation. The suggestions include the following: (1) developing personal evacuation plans before the need for an evacuation arises and knowing which routes will be available; (2) being prepared for traffic delays; (3) leaving as early as possible; and, (4) encouraging people on the Gulf Coast to make northward travel plans and shelter arrangements.