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  Arms and Influence: Yugoslav and American Relations

  By Roman Hlatky
   Arms policy, and particularly the sale of weapons, was a major technique in the Cold War repertoires of both the USSR and the United States. Arms sales were used to curry favor with foreign governments and to ensure the stabilization of friendly regimes. A telegraph from the American ambassador in Belgrade, Charles Burke Elbrick, dated from 1964, shows how the tension of dealing arms to non-aligned, but still socialist states functioned at the highest echelons of US government. The document is unique for both its interesting glimpse into US policy toward Yugoslavia, and for illustrating how Yugoslavian government played the United States and the USSR against one another in order to maintain and better its own position.   
  
  Elbrick writes that the Yugoslavian government has begun to consider signing weapon sales agreements with the USSR, and notes that the Soviet offers of “attractive prices, good delivery terms, and the absence of good alternative are seen as providing much incentive” for Yugoslavia to start buying arms from the Soviets. Elbrick bases his assessment on conversation with officials in the Yugoslav command. The implicit assumption here is that Yugoslav officials likely knew how to best induce the two global hegemons to provide terms most beneficial to the Yugoslav state. Elbrick suggests exactly such a concession should be made: the government of Yugoslavia “should have access to US market to procure spare and other components”.
  
  Also of note, is Elbrick’s mention of the strength of the Yugoslav army. He mentions both their “high morale and excellent record”. Perhaps, this statement was included to remind US high command of the strategic importance of Yugoslavia in containing the USSR. However, the document does directly suggest that Yugoslavia is willing to cozy up to the USSR. Elbrick mentions, towards the beginning of the document, the Yugoslav frustration at not having a suitable alternative other than the USSR. He is also careful to make clear that he is not suggesting direct military aid for Yugoslavia, but rather access to the market for parts and components that can be used for military purposes, but do not serve said purposes directly.
  
  This document provides an interesting microcosmic glimpse into Cold War relations. Several facets standout in particular: (1) Yugoslavia’s reluctance to cozy up to the USSR so it can continue to make use of strategic non-alignment; (2) the importance of the Yugoslav state in geopolitics; (3) the US reluctance to directly aid a socialist state militarily, most likely due to a fear of aggravating the USSR; and (4) the ability of the Yugoslav government to situate itself between the United States and the USSR for its own benefit.